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Impulsivity research has most commonly address reward-focused behaviors, often 
overlooking facets of impulsivity related to negative affect and punishment avoidance.  Though 
viewed as distinct characteristics, common psychological and physiological vulnerabilities exist 
for impulsivity and negative mood.  The diminished ability to delay immediate rewards to 
achieve long-term goals is a hallmark of impulsive behavior that frequently co-occurs with 
negative mood and results in many maladaptive health behaviors, such as anxiety, depression, 
and addiction.  Using a delayed discounting paradigm paired with mood induction, we examined 
how Negative Urgency, a type of impulsivity related to negative affect, was associated with 
delay discounting behaviors and shared neural substrates. 
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 Participants (N = 66) completed self-report measures of impulsivity and performed a 
delayed discounting task following negative and neutral mood induction.  Additionally, a subset 
of participants (N = 18) performed the delay discounting task and mood induction while 
undergoing an fMRI scan.  The mood induction involved participants reading a series of neutral 
statements and negatively-valenced statements while listening to mood-congruent music.  
Following the mood induction, participants were shown a series of two monetary choices, each 
varying in magnitude in terms of value and time delay, and selected one of the choices. 
Results of the study showed that negative urgency was not significantly related to the rate 
at which participants discounted the value of future rewards behaviorally.  Exploratory analyses 
did show possible relationships between other personality factors and delay discounting rates.  
fMRI results showed no main effect for negative mood fMRI results with Negative Urgency 
were non-significant, though right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex activation correlated with a 
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Many short-term rewarding behaviors can be deleterious when aggregated over time, and 
so selecting behaviors that service long-term goals at the expense of immediate reward can be a 
highly adaptive strategy (Bickel & Marsch, 2000).  This ability to select more distal, 
advantageous behaviors is a powerful predictor of many health behaviors.  Those who are less 
able to make these advantageous choices are more likely to engage in a number of risky behavior 
patterns, such as chronic smoking (Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999), substance abuse (Coffey, 
Gudleski, Saladin, & Brady, 2003; Perry & Carroll, 2008), and overeating (Guerrieri et al., 
2007).  Additionally, reduced ability to delay reward is associated with psychiatric conditions 
like bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder (Bellani et al., 
2012; Pawluk & Koerner, 2013).   
Because many health decisions are driven by the receipt of reward (and the activation of 
concomitant dopamine pathways), individuals experience an emotional component in the 
decision-making process.  Most often the positively-valenced emotions related to reward 
sensitivity are the focus of impulsivity research, and indeed the positive sensations of reward are 
powerful motivations.  In addition to reward sensitivity, however, sensitivity to punishment can 
also provide motivation in decision-making.  A construct that addresses motivation arising from 
sensitivity to punishment is negative urgency, which is an emotion-based disposition that is “a 
tendency to commit rash or regrettable actions as a result of intense negative affect” (Whiteside 
& Lynam, 2001).  This is a type of impulsivity that differs from other, more traditional flavors of 
impulsivity, as it describes impulsive behaviors as an “active avoidance” strategy rather than 
approach to reward.  Because the hypothesized motivational factors of negative urgency are 
unique among impulsivity constructs, research thus far has been limited and has required 
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modifications to existing theories of impulsivity to account for new findings.  Negative urgency 
is compatible with these constructs insofar as it is correlated with other types of impulsivity, but 
also uniquely contributes to impulsive behavior in ways that are not yet understood.  In 
particular, the neurological characteristics of negative urgency are not well known.  
Understanding the relationship between impulsive personality traits and mood will provide 
insight into how these characteristics may influence many psychiatric conditions like depression, 
anxiety, and substance abuse, as well as other health behaviors.   
Impulsivity 
Impulsivity is a multidimensional personality characteristic associated with acting 
without thinking and enhanced sensitivity to reward.  The sub-constructs of impulsivity share 
common features that broadly include behavioral disinhibition and executive under-regulation.  
Various sub-constructs of impulsivity include different aspects of disinhibition, such as sensation 
seeking, lack of persistence, impatience, harm avoidance, inattention, and novelty seeking 
(Evenden, 1999; Kirby & Finch, 2010).  For the sake of convenience, impulsivity will be 
referred to in this paper as a single construct, though we recognize that impulsivity may more 
accurately be viewed as a category of these more specific, distinct-but-related sub-constructs.   
Models of Impulsivity 
Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory.  Perhaps the most influential and studied 
formulation of impulsivity proposed is the Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST; Gray, 1970).  
This theory posits two systems that govern behavior: the behavioral activation system (BAS) and 
the behavior inhibition system (BIS).  These systems are hypothesized to be two dimensions of 
behavior that drive an organism either to approach a novel stimulus or situation (BAS) or to 
withdraw and avoid a stimulus or situation (BIS).  An individual with a high BAS is 
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hypothesized to be driven by the potential for rewards and is thought of as being “activated” (i.e., 
approach-driven) toward reward and less sensitive to punishment.  This person would more 
readily detect cues of reward in the environment.  In cases where the BAS is relatively more 
active than the BIS (which constrains approach behaviors) the individual would engage more 
freely in approach behaviors that were immediately rewarding.  In contrast, an individual with a 
relatively more active BIS is more likely to be sensitive to punishment and prone to anxiety.  In 
this state of cognitive and physiological arousal, a person appraises an environmental stimulus as 
threatening or dangerous and typically engages in avoidance of that stimulus (Elwood, Wolitzky-
Taylor, & Olatunji, 2011).  This increased sensitivity to punishment would cause avoidance of 
stimuli and decrease the likelihood of acting impulsively to seek reward.  These two systems are 
hypothesized to influence one another but activate relatively independently, resulting in behavior 
patterns as described above (relatively high BAS = more impulsive, relatively high BIS = more 
restrained). 
This two-part model has been refined over the years, incorporating the concept of the 
flight-fight-freeze system (FFFS; Gray, 1982; Gray & MacNaughton, 2000).  The FFFS monitors 
potentially aversive stimuli in the environment and evaluates these stimuli for potential harm or 
threat.  When potential harm is detected, the FFFS would attempt to engage avoidance behaviors.  
In this updated model, the BIS moderates competition between the FFFS and BAS and selects 
the course of action that an individual takes (Carver, Johnson, & Joormann, 2009; Gray, 1987; 
McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004; Reuter et al., 2004).  The BIS is only activated 
as a response to BAS-FFFS conflict rather than by a stimulus directly.  A rewarding stimulus 
with no detected drawbacks would engage the BAS without any moderation from the BIS.  
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Should the FFFS detect an aversive quality to a potentially rewarding stimulus, then the BIS 
would engage and attempt to resolve the conflict and select the most advantageous behavior.   
Another modern alteration to the traditional RST is that the BIS and BAS are not 
necessarily viewed as orthogonally-related, fully-independent systems.  The joint-subsystems 
version of the RST views the BIS and BAS as systems capable of mutual influence that can give 
differential levels of activation depending on the combination and intensities of BIS and BAS 
(Corr, 2002).  An individual with an active BIS (i.e., high anxiety) and active BAS (i.e., high 
impulsivity) may then be acting impulsively as a way to protect the person through rash, 
thoughtless action motivated by punishment avoidance (Corr, 2002).  The BIS’s punishment 
detection function has been allocated to the FFFS and its regulatory role means it is frequently 
being activated by BAS and FFFS as well as inhibiting those systems, often simultaneously. 
Eysenck’s PEN Model.  Other theories of impulsivity have proposed similar 
mechanisms to the RST that drive impulsive behaviors.  One such theory of impulsivity proposes 
introversion/extraversion and neuroticism/emotional stability as the primary dimensions that 
govern behavior (a normal/psychoticism dimension is also proposed but does not relate directly 
to impulsive behavior) (PEN; Eysenck, 1981).  In this system, impulsive behaviors would come 
from those high in neuroticism and high in extraversion, essentially being highly activated and 
likely to respond to negative stimuli.  One could also be low in neuroticism and high in 
extraversion and exhibit low-anxiety, impulsive behaviors similar to behaviors driven by BAS.  
Anxiety would result from low extraversion and high neuroticism paralleling high BIS.  Low 
impulsivity would be a combination of low neuroticism and introversion, resembling a moderate 
BIS and moderate BAS.  The RST and PEN’s two dimensions map onto each other in a rotated 
fashion – approximately 30° according to Gray (1994).  The PEN therefore accounts for similar 
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aspects of behavior as the RST, though the rotation means it does not describe the behaviors of 
interest as effectively for the present study’s conception of impulsivity.  The psychoticism scale 
also does not equate well with the FFFS.  Additionally, the proposed physiological 
underpinnings for the PEN are not as robust as those for the RST (Dawe, Gullo, & Loxton, 2004; 
Evenden, 1999). 
Psychobiological Model of Temperament and Character.  Cloninger posited a model 
of impulsivity describing harm avoidance, novelty seeking, and reward dependence as the 
primary dimensions of personality governing approach and avoidance behaviors (Cloninger, 
1987; Cloninger, Svrakic, & Przybeck, 1993).  In this model, the harm avoidance dimension 
engages in behavioral inhibition and is sensitive to environmental signals of punishment and 
non-reward.  Cloninger suggests that these behaviors are governed by serotonin pathways in the 
brain and cause passive avoidance and extinction behaviors.  Novelty seeking is a system of 
behavioral activation that is primarily modulated by the neurotransmitter dopamine.  Novelty 
seeking is similar to the BAS and accounts for behaviors like exploratory pursuit, approach, and 
active avoidance.  The active avoidance aspect shares features with the FFFS and illustrates how 
Cloninger’s constructs do not fully overlap with the RST.  Reward dependence is resistance to 
extinction and behavioral maintenance of already learned behaviors.  How this dimension 
compares to the RST is unclear, though its description is consistent with current research on the 
behavioral mechanisms for addiction, which are frequently tied to dopamine receptors and not 
norepinephrine as Cloninger proposed, though the question of whether both are involved remains 
open (Volkow, Wang, Fowler, & Tomasi, 2012). 
Carver’s Model. A model of impulsivity by Carver et al.  (2008; Carver et al., 2009) 
suggests a more prominent role for serotonin in the evaluative systems rather than the dopamine 
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system implicated in impulsive decision-making and addiction (Cyders & Smith, 2008; 
Rothemund et al., 2007; Winstanley, 2007).  The reactive system is an evolutionarily more 
primitive system that guides action based on efficient, quick, and emotional appraisal of stimuli 
while the reflective system is a more advanced system of self-regulation and executive function.  
The reactive system parallels the idea of an active BAS and FFFS where one would act “without 
thinking” (i.e., without strong executive processing).  This system would employ more 
cytoarchitecturally primitive areas based on quick, unrefined appraisal of environmental stimuli.  
The reactive system acts on available information in response to situations of urgency.  The 
reflective system parallels the BIS, where restraint would be employed by an active 
executive/inhibitory response.  The reflective system would function as a way to evaluate 
conflicting or complicated signals from the reactive system (BAS/FFFS) and select the choice 
deemed most adaptive to the situation.  Impulsive behavior occurs when the reactive system is 
more effective in governing behavior than the reflective system (i.e., either the reactive system is 
hyperactive and overpowers the reflective system or the reflective system is hypoactive and is 
unable to inhibit the reactive system).  A diminished capability of the reflective system to 
regulate impulsive behavior is a common feature for both impulsivity and mood disorders (Apter 
et al., 1990; Carver et al., 2008, 2009; Cyders & Smith, 2008).  
Summary of models.  Models described so far have been derived primarily from 
questionnaire data and the development of theoretical constructs.  How well each was tied to 
underlying physical substrates that give rise to impulsive behaviors has varied from model to 
model, though the research for the RST in particular has yielded many results as it has been 
refined over the years (Evenden, 1999).   
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Across all of these models there is considerable theoretical and experimental overlap and 
a great deal of research examines what brain circuitry might be involved with both approach and 
avoidance behaviors (and any number of complex combinations of the two).  The model used in 
the present paper is the RST and is illustrated in Figure 1.  This model provides a framework for 
the hypotheses about negative urgency that will be addressed by this research study.  
Additionally, the RST is able to accommodate other aspects of theories that are theoretically 
useful in describing how negative urgency may operate at a neurobiological level (e.g., including 
aspects of the reflective and reactive system’s serotonin system explanation).   
 








Negative urgency, the tendency to act impulsively to actively avoid negative affect, is not 
yet fully integrated with existing theories of impulsivity in the literature.  The RST, particularly 
the joint-subsystems theory that views the BIS and BAS as systems capable of mutual influence 
as opposed to completely orthogonal systems (Corr, 2002), is able to accommodate the model 
proposed in the present study.  The RST model and the Reactive/Reflective model both include a 
role for specific neurotransmitters as primary moderators of expressed behaviors.  Dopamine 
systems have been in the forefront of reward processing research.  The focus on dopamine 
systems is congruent with the reward-focus of many types of impulsivity but it does not fully 
account for the emotional regulation systems that are responsible for internal emotional states 
that may motivate certain types of actions, such as avoidance of harm or the actions associated 
with the FFFS.   
A proposed physiological mechanism for vulnerability to negative urgency is suboptimal 
regulation of the serotonin system.  Gray (1987) notes that the BIS is mediated by serotonin, with 
deficiencies resulting in less executive controls over impulsive drives as do Carver et al.  (2008, 
2009) for the reflective system.  The majority of serotonin within the brain is synthesized in the 
raphe nucleus, a structure in the brainstem that has projections primarily to the forebrain, 
amygdala, thalamus, and hypothalamus (Jacobs & Azmitia, 1992).  When this system is impaired 
or otherwise under-functioning, individuals express emotional dysregulation (Canli & Lesch, 
2007; Davidson, Putnam, & Larson, 2000) and behavioral learning deficits (Crockett, Clark, & 
Robbins, 2009).  Reduced overall levels of serotonin in individuals has been shown to predict 
increased impulsivity and mood disorders, which are all subsequently related to the development 
of negative health behaviors (Carver et al., 2009; Siever & Trestman, 1993).   
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Figure 2 describes the present study’s proposed model for how negative urgency relates 
to the BIS/BAS model described in Figure 1.  In this case individuals with high trait negative 
urgency would have a more easily activated FFFS – they are temperamentally more likely to find 
threatening stimuli in the environment.  The BIS, for a number of possible reasons – low 
serotonin levels, insufficient cognitive resources, conditioned hypervigilance – is then unable to 
moderate the FFFS and the BAS effectively.  Even if an individual under normal circumstances 
would not have an “overactive” BAS (i.e., be prone to impulsivity), the potential for negative 
affect would be sufficiently threatening to the individual and the person would lack the cognitive 
resources to properly select an adaptive behavior.  Instead, the person engages the BAS as a 
means for active avoidance and makes an impulsive action. 
 





To illustrate this process, imagine a person who is being asked by a friend to work all 
weekend helping the friend move to a new home.  The person in that instance is faced with the 
choice of helping (and doing something he or she does not desire to do) or refusing (the person’s 
preferred choice).  However, in the moment of choosing the person feels a great deal of anxiety 
and social pressure to say yes.  In the moment when the person chooses to agree or not, the 
person is in an activated, anxious state and is lacking the cognitive resources to regulate the 
emotional response and select the long-term desired choice.  As a way to avoid this punishing 
negative affect the person selects the choice for short-term relief.  The immediate situation is 
ended, successfully avoiding current negative affect by impulsively selecting a choice with a net 
negative outcome for the individual.  This person under neutral or positively appraised situations 
may behave relatively non-impulsively and yet when stimuli evoke negative affect, the reaction 
may resemble other types of impulsivity – “acting without thinking.” The impulsive behavior is 
motivated through avoidance rather than approach. 
Self-Report Measures of Impulsivity 
A number of instruments have been developed to measure various facets of impulsivity 
and are divided essentially into two categories: self-report questionnaires and behavioral 
measures (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995; Whiteside, Lynam, Miller, & Reynolds, 2005).  
Self-report measures are questionnaires that typically use Likert-type items to assess various 
subtypes of impulsivity.  A widely-used impulsivity scale, the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11; 
Patton et al., 1995), has a main total score of “impulsivity” that is the sum of scores from all 
items.  Three second-order factors exist which combine six lower subtypes of impulsivity: 
Attentional (Attention, Cognitive Instability), Motor (Motor, Perseverance), and Nonplanning 
(Self-Control, Cognitive Complexity).  To compare, the UPPS+P Impulsive Behaviour scale 
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(Whiteside et al., 2005) is a five-dimensional measure of impulsivity with no higher-order 
measures of impulsivity.  The scales measured in the UPPS+P are Negative Urgency, (lack of) 
Premeditation, (lack of) Perseverance, Sensation Seeking, and Positive Urgency.  The scales for 
these two instruments are measuring multiple facets of impulsivity in different ways; though 
overlap exists, no two scales between them are directly measuring the same construct.  For 
instance, Premeditation, Perseverance, and Negative Urgency all share overlap with the second-
order factors from the BIS-11.  From preliminary research by this author, it appears that 
Negative Urgency is not significantly correlated with the BIS-11 Sensation Seeking subscale and 
the UPPS+P Sensation Seeking scale is only significantly related to the second-order Motor 
scale.  Scales from different instruments have varying degrees of overlap but no one scale is 
comprehensive.  Even though these two measures both are targeting the same phenomenon, 
impulsivity, they are each capturing different facets that exist in that classification.  These 
questionnaires also have the same limitations of most self-report measures in that the items are 
face-valid, enabling respondents to appear a certain way if they wish; rely on self-perceptions, 
which may not reflect actual behavior; and do not capture actual behaviors of impulsivity, which 
limits their ability to predict behavior. 
Kirby and Finch (2010) conducted a principle components analysis of many impulsivity 
questions from impulsivity questionnaires and other self-report measures of personality.  Seven 
meaningful components of impulsivity were found in this analysis that could not be statistically 
decomposed further; however, at different points in their analysis different numbers of factors 
existed that reflected common terms for impulsivity subtypes.  For instance, “sensation seeking” 
quickly emerged and was separated from “unprepared/spontaneous.” Neither of these terms 
survived the process, being further broken down into other factors such as “impetuous,” 
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“divertible,” “thrill and risk,” and “impatience,” among others.  This analysis highlights further 
the diversity of impulsivity types, the multiple “levels” that a construct may exist at (i.e., it may 
be composed of other sub-constructs), and the difficulty of using a common vocabulary for 
describing impulsive features.   
Behavioral measures of impulsivity are measures that directly assess impulsive behavior, 
eliminating self-report bias and other weaknesses of the self-report measures.  These measures 
assess cognitive processes that are believed to be related to impulsivity (i.e., specific patterns of 
performance may indicate the degree to which an individual is more impulsive relative to a 
normal population of peers).  These measures have included the Color Word Stroop (Stroop, 
1935) for inhibition, Digit Span (Weiss et al., 2010) for working memory and attention, Iowa 
Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) for planning and decision-
making, and Delay Discounting tasks (Bickel & Marsch, 2001) for reward inhibition and 
executive control, among others.  While these measures have strengths that questionnaires do 
not, they include their own drawbacks.  Many experimental variations exist making 
standardization difficult across studies, they are more time-intensive for participants, and they 
similarly are only addressing certain sub-constructs of impulsivity.  To further complicate 
measurement, behavioral and self-report measures are only weakly correlated with one another 
(Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006; Stanford et al., 2009).   
To account for these difficulties of measurement, the present study will include common 
self-report measures and a standardized behavior paradigm for analyzing the construct of 
negative urgency.  This will allow multiple areas of impulsivity to be captured and compared 
within the study and with extant studies in the mood and impulsivity literature.  Additionally, 
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isolating a single construct of impulsivity to study will remove the problems of measurement that 
come from treating impulsivity as a unitary construct. 
Delay Discounting 
Delay Discounting is a paradigm that measures behavioral impulsivity in terms of how 
successful an individual is at obtaining the greatest amount of value from the task when choosing 
from smaller, nearer reward values versus relatively larger, delayed values (e.g., electing to have 
$5 today versus $25 in four weeks).  How much one is willing to delay the reward is a non-linear 
function of how much they value the delayed reward relative to the delay amount and this 
discounting curve differs for each individual.  These curves describe the degree to which each 
person will prefer what reward value at different delay lengths.  These curves are calculated with 
the equation V =  
A
1+𝑘D
 , where the value (V) of a choice is equal to that amount (A) divided by 
one plus the value of the delayed reinforcer (D) at the given rate (k).  Brain activation in 
executive control areas when the delayed conditions are selected showed increased activation 
concordant with length of delay being selected (Bickel, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, Koffarnus, & 
Gatchalian, 2012; McClure et al., 2004; Wittmann, Leland, & Paulus, 2007). 
An important element of delay discounting as it relates to k calculations is the switchpoint 
(or indifference point).  Switchpoints are the value at which an individual is equally likely to 
select an immediate, lesser value as he or she is to select a delayed, greater value.  For instance, 
at a 2 week delay, an individual with a switchpoint if $60 would be just as likely to select the $60 
today versus waiting 2 weeks for $100.  For all values below that switchpoint (e.g., $55) we 
would predict that individual chooses to select the larger, delayed option.  For all values above 
that switchpoint (e.g., $75) we would predict that the individual would choose the smaller, 
immediate option.  For each different time delay an individual will have a different switchpoint.  
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Typically as the length of delay for the delayed choice is increased, the switchpoint will become 
lower.  These switchpoints are used when calculating k to determine D, the value of the delayed 
reinforcer that is idiosyncratic for each individual.  By calculating several switchpoints for 
several time delays, the curve for k can be calculated and the individual’s rate of discounting can 
be determined. 
Similar to impulsivity, researchers have identified several brain activation patterns that 
are characteristic of mood-related dysfunction.  Networks of emotional regulation include a 
prominent role for the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and connected areas, including the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), amygdala, ventral striatum, 
ventral pallidum, and medial thalamic nuclei (Drevets, Price, & Furey, 2008; Öngür, Ferry, & 
Price, 2003).  Individuals at high-risk for depression have shown diminished functioning in these 
emotional regulatory brain regions in fMRI studies (Joormann, Cooney, Henry, & Gotlib, 2012) 
suggesting similar areas that under-function in impulsivity may be under-functioning for 
negative affect regulation.  Patients with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder have shown 
hypoactivations in ventral mPFC and ACC while other anxiety disorders result in 
hyperactivation of the amygdala and insular cortex (Etkin & Wager, 2007).  While mood 
disorders are collectively heterogeneous in their exact patterns of activation, areas associated 
with the evaluation and expression of emotions are repeatedly found across studies indicating 
that a common system of emotion regulation, when impaired, can lead to dysfunctional negative 
affect.  This emotional regulation system also appears to be intertwined with the regulation of 
impulsive behavior so that the dysfunction of this system may manifest in a behaviorally distinct 
way.   
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We believe delay discounting will address negative urgency because it recreates a 
situation likely to elicit an impulsive response in those high in Negative Urgency.  The ability to 
delay discount requires cognitive resources and self-control to select a choice with no 
immediately rewarding qualities, but likely positive long-term outcomes.  Negative urgency is 
postulated to result from ineffective regulation of the self, emotional response, or insufficient 
cognitive resources and so the person chooses an immediate choice (active avoidance of negative 
affect) at the expense of a future positive consequence.  Since delay discounting offers selection 
between two choices based on immediate versus delayed rewards it should be sensitive to those 
with differences in their abilities to regulate impulses under different mood conditions. 
Negative Urgency and Mood 
The most important aspect to consider in the model of negative urgency is how that 
construct relates to negative mood, which is unique from other impulsivity types.  Impulsivity 
constructs can be sorted into three different categories: emotion-based actions, deficits of 
conscientiousness, and sensation seeking (Dick et al., 2010).  Negative urgency is in the category 
of emotion-based actions.  The hallmark of negative urgency is its ties to negative affect and how 
impulsivity to avoid negative affect leads to long-term negative outcomes in the favor of 
immediate emotional relief.  Such patterns are observed in current research that identifies areas 
where negative urgency and mood are related to negative outcomes including alcohol use, eating 
disorders, and depressive interpersonal relationships (Anestis, Selby, & Joiner, 2007; Karyadi & 
King, 2011; Van der Linden et al., 2006).  Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is also related to 
the rash behaviors of those scoring high on negative urgency (Pawluk & Koerner, 2013); the 
reason hypothesized by the authors for those with likely GAD is that the “intolerance of negative 
emotions prompts impulsive behavior” (p. 736).  By itself negative mood also predicts behaviors 
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of substance dependence and predicts the onset and maintenance of addictive behaviors (Conner, 
Pinquart, & Gamble, 2009; Strine et al., 2008; Weinberger, George, & McKee, 2011; White, 
Grilo, O'Malley, & Potenza, 2010). 
Another predictor of engaging in negative health behaviors is current and past instances 
of psychiatric mood disorder symptoms.  Several studies have shown major depressive disorder, 
anxiety disorders, and bipolar disorder are frequent predictors of smoking addiction, alcohol 
abuse, obesity, and other substance abuse (Arnow, Kenardy, & Agras, 1995; Dilleen et al., 2012; 
Finzi-Dottan & Zubery, 2009; Strine et al., 2008; Sulkowski et al., 2009; Swann, Steinberg, 
Lijffijt, & Moeller, 2008; Weinberger et al., 2011).  One theory asserts that the psychological 
pain and dysregulation associated with these mood disorders motivates individuals to use risky 
methods of coping, which leads to individuals initiating negative health behaviors that provide 
immediate pain reduction (Baker, Piper, McCarthy, Majeskie, & Fiore, 2004).  The 
psychophysiological dysregulation creates a drive for immediate relief and diminishes the 
individual’s natural ability to act towards long-term goals.   
Overall, the evidence supports conditions where impulsive behaviors are made because of 
sensitivity to punishment and not necessarily for seeking reward.  In these situations, individuals 
are acting impulsively to escape negative affect and seek respite via immediately rewarding 
behaviors.  While there is a “reward” of sorts (feeling better by avoiding negative affect), the 
reward aspect is not derived from approaching some valued reward but from avoiding a 
situation.  It is the anxiety of being punished that instigates the impulsive action.   
Mood induction and negative urgency.  Negative urgency is associated not only with 
acting rashly in response to a negative stimulus, but also failing to regulate emotion effectively.  
In situations of heightened emotionality (e.g., fear, anxiety, threat of negative affect generally) 
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the characteristics of negative urgency are activated and result in impulsive choices.  In the 
absence of negative affect an individual with high negative urgency may appear no more 
impulsive than any other person.  It is the combination of personality traits plus environmental 
interaction that gives rise to the impulsive choice.   
Mood induction is an experimental procedure in which individuals are exposed to stimuli 
that elicit some form of affect, positive or negative.  Mood induction is used to examine how an 
individual’s performance on any task may be changed by manipulating their emotional state.  
Positive mood induction can increase performance (i.e., decrease discounting rates) on a delay 
discounting task (Hirsh, Guindon, Morisano, & Peterson, 2010), while negative mood induction 
can impair a person’s ability to negotiate for better long-term rewards (Brooks & Schweitzer, 
2011).  Neuroimaging studies of mood induction show that negative mood induction has a 
pervasive effect on areas of the brain that aid in emotion regulation, including areas of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), ACC, and mPFC (Drevets et al., 2008; Joormann et al., 
2012).   
Methods for inducing mood include using stimuli with emotional valence such as guided 
imagery, imaginal prompts, reading sentences/stories, music, and performance feedback (Mayer, 
Allen, & Beauregard, 1995; Richell & Anderson, 2004; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 
1996).  Combinations of various methods are also often used, with one being a primary mood 
inducer and the other as a secondary inducer of the mood, usually for maintenance of the effect 
during the other experimental task.  A common combination is to use emotionally-valenced 
sentences, known as Velten or Velten-type statements (Velten, 1968), and mood-congruent 
music.  Reviews of mood induction methods have found all these methods equally effective, with 
films perhaps having a slightly stronger effect (Westermann et al., 1996).  Robinson, Grillon, and 
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Sahakian (2012) recommend a combination of Velten-type statements and mood-congruent 
music since they are shown to have repeatable effects, are useful for many neurocognitive 
paradigms, and are more easily standardized for comparison to other studies.   
Neuroimaging, Reward, and Decision-Making 
Experimental designs using neuroimaging techniques have found dopamine-sensitive 
brain regions to be the regions that underlie impulsive and reward-seeking behaviors.  fMRI 
experiments where individuals respond to the value of an immediate reward in tasks such as 
delay discounting (Hinvest, Elliott, McKie, & Anderson, 2011), monetary incentive delay (Beck 
et al., 2009), and stimulus-response-reward contingencies (Diekhof et al., 2011) show activations 
in major components of the dopamine reward system, including the medial OFC, ventral 
striatum, insula, and amygdala.  These brain regions are primarily limbic structures that 
correspond with the reactive BAS and are involved with appetitive responses to environmental 
stimuli. 
Regions associated with the BIS are reflective brain areas that are implicated in executive 
control and emotional regulation.  Right DLPFC was found to be inversely related to impulsive 
responses on a Go/No-Go task (Adinoff, 2004).  Right lateral OFC, posterior OFC, and superior 
temporal gyrus were found also found to be active in participants who were able to inhibit 
impulsive behaviors  (Horn, Dolan, Elliott, Deakin, & Woodruff, 2003).  A delay discounting 
task by McClure et al.  (2004) demonstrated that those able to inhibit immediately rewarding 
stimuli and select long-term, more valuable rewards activated DLPFC and posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC).  Prefrontal cortex (PFC) and other reflective regions are also associated with areas 
sensitive to serotonin (Crockett et al., 2009; Verdejo-García & Bechara, 2009). 
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Behaviorally, high-impulsive individuals show an increased sensitivity to the perceived 
value of a reward and show relatively higher activation in dopamine reward areas when 
contrasted with low-impulsive controls.  Among groups associated with high impulsivity, such as 
those with food addiction, high-impulsive individuals show increased sensitivity to the potential 
for rewards with relatively diminished sensitivity to the reward itself (Bechara, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 2000; Davis, Strachan, & Berkson, 2004).  High-impulsive individuals showed 
decreased activation in BIS areas, such as lateral OFC, DLPFC, and PCC, when making 
decisions favoring immediate reward.  Low-impulsive individuals conversely showed greater 
activation in similar areas of impulse control indicating active processing of long-term reward 
value and the ability to act toward that goal.  In addition to their high reward sensitivity, high-
impulsive individuals in this study showed decreased sensitivity to punishment, which further 
increased the likelihood of under-restrained impulsive action (Gearhardt et al., 2011; Noël et al., 
2011).   
Summary of Review 
A traditional view of impulsivity is that those who are impulsive are less sensitive to 
punishment and more sensitive to reward.  However current research indicates that sensitivity to 
reward may not be the only motivation of impulsive approach-behaviors. Emotional salience and 
reactivity is a central premise for the somatic marker theory of addiction (Verdejo-García & 
Bechara, 2009; Verdejo-García, Pérez-García, & Bechara, 2006), the reactive/reflective model, 
and the most modern conceptualization of the RST.  Research by Martin, Cox, Brooks, and 
Savage (2014) has shown that in the case of cigarette smokers are more sensitive to punishment, 
a finding not in line with traditional views but more consistent with emerging research.  A theory 
of impulsivity must account for both trait and state tendencies of an individual and facilitate a 
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multi-faceted view of impulsivity.  Viewing impulsivity in a more fine-grained way does not 
preclude the idea that more general systems underlie general impulsivity (it appears that 
generally speaking, they do) but suggests that these general systems give rise to specific 
impulsivity sub-constructs and that certain patterns of interacting brain systems can predict 
specific tendencies in behavior related to reward and impulsivity.   
The aims of this study were to explore the relationship between negative urgency and 
mood through behavioral and neuroimaging methods.  Specifically the study experimentally 
evaluated how negative urgency relates to delay discounting when an induced negative mood 
may put additional demands on brain areas hypothesized to regulate this type of impulsive 
behavior.  Exploring both mood and impulsivity simultaneously provided a unique perspective 
for how these functions interact in common neurobiological pathways and behavioral outcomes.  
A delay discounting task was used to measure impulsivity behaviorally and within the brain.  
Delay discounting is a task that measures a person’s preference for smaller, immediate rewards 
versus larger, delayed rewards.  Concurrent with the delay discounting task was a negative and 
neutral mood induction task so participants performed the delay discounting task two different 
mood states. 
Research Aims/Hypotheses 
Aim 1: To explore how negative mood induction influences impulsive decision-
making. 
Hypothesis 1: Negative mood induction will result in the diminished ability of 
individuals to choose larger delayed rewards compared to their performance in neutral mood 
conditions.   
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Hypothesis 2: Individuals scoring higher on negative urgency will have diminished 
ability to choose larger delayed rewards during the negative mood induction condition compared 
to individuals with lower negative urgency. 
 
Aim 2: To understand how mood and decision-making interact in terms of shared 
neurocircuitry.   
Hypothesis 1: Areas associated with inhibitory control to reward cues will be attenuated 
in conditions of increased negative affect compared to neutral affect (DLPFC, lateral OFC, 
PCC).   
Hypothesis 2: Areas associated with increased emotionality and sensitivity to rewards 
will be more highly activated in the negative affect condition compared to the neutral affect 
condition (medial OFC, amygdala, ventral striatum). 
 
Aim 3: To determine brain region differences of decision-making as a function of 
negative urgency under negative mood induction.   
Hypothesis 1: Individuals with high urgency impulsivity will show attenuated activation 
in areas of executive control areas (DLPFC, lateral OFC, PCC) when selecting immediate 
rewards versus delayed rewards.   
Hypothesis 2: Individuals with high urgency impulsivity will show relatively higher 
activation in areas related to immediate reward valuation (medial OFC, mPFC, ventrolateral PFC 






Participants and Procedures 
Involvement in the study consisted of approximately 1.5 hours of participation for 
participants completing behavioral-only protocol of the study and 2.5 - 3 total hours for 
participants recruited for the fMRI portion.  The study recruited 60 adults to complete the mood 
induction and delay discounting protocol.  Of that group, 12 participants completed the mood 
induction and delay discounting tasks within the fMRI scanner.  Participants were between the 
ages of 18-31, undergraduates from The University of Kansas who were fluent in English as a 
primary language.   
Participants for the study were recruited through the online University of Kansas (KU) 
Psychology Research Participation System (SONA).  Sixty participants were recruited, with one 
fMRI participant being excluded from the final analysis because of alterations in the scanning 
protocol following their participation.  This cohort was chosen because of the proposed study’s 
exploratory nature, to ensure a relatively homogenous population, and to be comparable to prior 
impulsivity research.  Research credits required for completion of their psychology coursework 
were offered as compensation for their time and participation.  Participation in the study was 
voluntary and participants were free to withdraw at any time. 
All participants for the fMRI study were English-speaking, right-handed, and able to be 
scanned in an fMRI (e.g., no metal medical implants that would prohibit use of an MRI scanner).  
Right-handed participants were selected to minimize the possibility of unpredictable brain 
function lateralization that can occur with left-handed or ambidextrous persons.  For the 




Recruitment and Informed Consent.  Participants were recruited from The University 
of Kansas Lawrence campus via the SONA online subject recruitment pool.  Online screening 
occurred prior to consent to ensure participants qualified for inclusion in the present study.  
Written explanation for the study rationale and participant requirements was given.  All subjects 
participating in the study consented to participate as evidenced by signing a paper informed 
consent form.  Subjects were informed that they were free to withdraw their consent at any time 
with no penalty.  When consent is withdrawn, participation in the study will be terminated and 
no additional data will be collected or used for analysis. 
Written informed consent for fMRI participants was obtained prior to beginning 
assessment.  A verbal explanation of the study was provided in addition to the written 
explanation included in the consent form.  Participants were encouraged to ask questions 
concerning the study.  After reading the consent form, participants were given the opportunity to 
ask any questions and to provide a verbal summary of the study to assess participant's 
understanding of the study.  For the purposes of consent, participants were expected to verbalize 
an understanding of the following study aspects: 1) administration of behavioral measures during 
initial assessment, 2) imaging of their brain activity by MRI, requiring their body to be within an 
enclosed space for approximately an hour, and 3) administration of mood induction and a delay 
discounting task during MRI.  The consent process took approximately 10 – 15 minutes for 
behavioral and fMRI participants.  An additional 10 minutes of explanation of what to expect in 
the MRI scanner and a detailed outline of the response procedure was given specifically to fMRI 
participants. 
All behavioral and cognitive assessments were completed in a private room with only the 
examiner present.  The MRI control room and scanner were located in a private area set apart 
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from the front area of Hoglund Brain Imaging Center (HBIC).  The door to the control room was 
locked during scanning to prevent individuals not involved in the study from entering.  Only 
research personnel and MRI technicians were allowed within the scanning room when the 
participant is being scanned.   
Access to participant information and research data was limited to authorized research 
personnel.  All participants were assigned a unique identification number and all study materials 
and research data were associated exclusively with this number.  All testing materials and 
questionnaires were stored within a locked cabinet inside the locked lab facility at the HBIC.  A 
log was kept of all data collection and analysis steps completed for each subject.  For the MRI 
scans a research log was kept by the lab technicians regarding steps completed and any errors 
detected.  MRI data was saved on a CD kept by the lab technicians, as well as a CD kept by 
research personnel and was de-identified.  De-identified MRI data was saved on secure server 
(XNAT), which is firewall-protected and requires PI authorization to access.  All data were 
processed locally on computers within the HBIC.  All collected data was stored on hard drives 
within the HBIC computer lab and archived to the XNAT secure database system. 
Protection Against Risk 
Those who elected to participate were explicitly told that they may withdraw from the 
study at any time without negative consequence.  The consent form was reviewed with each 
participant and a copy of the consent form was given to the participant and as well as kept on file 
within the HBIC.  Ethical standards were monitored by the KUMC Institutional Review Board.  
All records were kept in locked filing cabinets in offices that accessible only to authorized staff 
and are kept locked when unoccupied.  Subject files were kept in a secure area, with access 
limited to designated staff members (PI and Co-Investigators). 
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All participants were briefed before the fMRI and completed an MRI safety checklist 
prior to entering the scanner.  Individuals with conditions contraindicated for MRI scanning were 
excluded from the study (i.e., pacemaker, surgical implants, claustrophobia, metal plates, 
pregnancy, etc.).  Participants in need of corrective eyewear will be fitted with plastic, scanner-
safe glasses.  Although participants typically remain alone in the MRI suite during scanning, 
research personnel were available to stay if requested by the participant.  No participants 
requested this option.  The scanner technicians and researchers were in audio contact with the 
participants in the scanner and will be able to respond immediately to participant requests. 
The negative mood induction for fMRI participants causing temporary discomfort was a 
concern.  Previous research has demonstrated that negative mood induction has effects that are 
short-lived and non-severe.  The sentences and music to which the participants were exposed did 
not include any extreme, violent, or disturbing features.  Participants were informed that some 
discomfort related to negative mood is to be expected and that they could halt the study at any 
time should they feel inclined to do so.  Post-induction debriefing included informal questions 
about the effectiveness of the induction, questions about the patients’ comfort during scans, and 
inquiries about anything that participants would like to ask the investigators.  Participants 
reported no major adverse effects from the scan or mood induction.  No participants indicated 
that they remained substantially affected by the mood induction and that they were relatively 
near their mood to baseline following debriefing. 
Measures 
The objective of this research project was to explore the relationship between impulsivity 
and mood, particularly brain activations associated with impulsivity and mood.  To achieve this 
objective we examined delay discounting behaviors and brain activations following a negative 
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mood induction and a neutral mood induction.  Multiple measures were used to evaluate 
impulsivity, including self-report, behavioral, and neuroimaging. 
Self-Report Measures.  Several behavioral measures were collected during prior to 
participants completing the mood induction and delay discounting tasks.  Questionnaires were 
collected online via secure internet connection to the REDCap survey and database service from 
a computer in research space on KU campus or Hoglund Brain Imaging Center.  REDCap is a 
system of data collection and storage developed by Vanderbilt University and housed within 
secure, HIPAA compliant servers within The University of Kansas.  In-person study procedures, 
including consent, additional questionnaires, and fMRI scanning, took place at HBIC on the 
KUMC campus.  All participants not completing the fMRI version of the protocol completed the 
study in confidential lab space on the University of Kansas campus.  Questionnaires completed 
online were done so in accordance with APA guidelines for online data collection. 
Though the primary measure of interest for the proposed hypotheses is negative urgency, 
additional behavioral measures were collected to explore other characteristics related to negative 
urgency and impulsivity relevant for this and possible future studies.  This information included 
demographic information, symptoms of anxiety and depression, sensitivity to reward and 
punishment, coping strategies, and other measures of impulsivity.  Collecting these measures 
also allows for comparison of some results to other studies that rely on the same measures.  
Measures used in the study are listed in the following subsection. 
Demographics questionnaire.  A short demographic questionnaire designed for this study 
was completed by the participants.  Information collected included age, gender, ethnicity, and 
brief psychiatric history. 
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The UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale (UPPS+P; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001).  This 45-
item self-report questionnaire measured 5 personality scales related to impulsivity personality 
traits: Negative Urgency, (lack of) Premeditation, (lack of) Perseverance, and Sensation-Seeking, 
and Positive Urgency.   
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995).  This 30-item self-report 
questionnaire measured impulsiveness.  Total score measures overall levels of general 
impulsivity.  Subscales include Attention, Motor, Self-Control, Cognitive Complexity, 
Perseverance, and Cognitive Instability.  Additionally, second-order factors of Attentional, 
Motor, and Non-planning are measured. 
The Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ; 
Torrubia, Ávila, Moltó, & Caseras, 2001).  This is a 48-item measure of Gray’s impulsivity 
(BAS) and anxiety (BIS) dimensions.  Participants selected “yes” or “no” to questions assessing 
an individual’s relative activation and restraint in a variety of ways.  Examples of questions 
included “Are you easily discouraged in difficult situations?” and “Do you sometimes do things 
for quick gains?” 
BIS/BAS Scale (BIS-BAS; Carver & White, 1994).  This is a 24-item Likert-type self-
report questionnaire that measures preferences for impulsive and inhibition preferences.  
Participants responded to questions like “Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit,” and “I go 
out of my way to get things I want,”  
The Beck Anxiety Inventory – Trait (BAI-T; Kohn, Kantor, DeCicco, & Beck, 2008).  
This is a 21-item self-report measure of trait anxiety.  Participants rated how much they generally 
feel they have been bothered by a particular symptom (from 0 = “not at all” to 3 = “severely, it 
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bothered me a lot”).  The BAI-T is a measure created specifically to discriminate from situational 
anxiety and from depressive symptoms. 
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977).  This is a 
20-item self-report measure of depressive symptoms that the participant has experienced during 
the past week.  Participants rate how they felt or behaved as prompted by each question (1 = 
“Rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day)” to 4 = “Most or all of the time (5 – 7 days)”). 
MR Screener (for fMRI participants only).  This is a short screener designed to assess 
eligibility for the fMRI section of the study and to ensure safety of participants by identifying 
potentially dangerous conditions (e.g., metal in the body).   
Mood Induction Measure.  This self-report questionnaire using adapted from a visual 
analog scale to a Likert-type scale with 4 choices ascertained the participant’s mood valence and 
intensity at 6 points during the study for the emotions of happy, calm, sad, bored, depressed, and 
anxious. 
Delay Discounting.  The delay discounting paradigm is a task that measures an 
individual’s preference for reward values of various magnitudes to be received at various lengths 
of delay.  The present study was modeled after the design used by McClure and colleagues 
(2004) for use in an fMRI.  During the task participants selected between two options: 1) a fixed 
reward ($100) given after a delay of some number of weeks, or 2) a smaller reward (less than 
$100) offered today.  All monetary “rewards” used for choices were hypothetical; participants 
received study credit for their time participating in the study and were instructed to make choices 
they were prefer if the money were real.  The two options were presented on either side of the 
screen and participants were given as much time as needed to make their selection by pressing 
“1” or “2” on the response pad.  An example trial is presented in Figure 2. 
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Participants completed 1 block of delay discounting before the first mood induction to 
obtain baseline k values The entire interval of available choices is divided into thirds (in this 
case, $0 - $100) and the initial choices were chosen as the one-third and two-third cut points.  
Based on the participants’ responses, choices were dynamically generated by offering values 
based on previous answers that would “narrow in” on each switchpoint for a given time delay by 
calculating new one-third and two-third cut points.  A complete description of the calculations to 
determine switchpoints in this way can be found in Wittmann et al. (2007).  The 8 trials for each 
delay were administered sequentially since the current values were determined by previous 
responses; the sets for each delay length were administered in random order.  For fMRI 
participants, pauses of 30 seconds between sets of trials were added to aid imaging data analysis.  
Total time for this block was approximately 3 minutes for behavioral participants and 5 minutes 
for fMRI participants.  For fMRI participants, this administration was also to ensure that the task 
was understood prior to their participation in the scanner.   
Two blocks of delay discounting trials following each mood induction block were 
administered.  The initial and first post-induction delay discounting blocks were approximately 5 
minutes in total length.  There were 40 total trials, 8 for each delay: 2-week, 4-week, 6-week, 12-
week, and no-delay (control trials).  The second post-induction delay discounting blocks 
comprised 60 total trials, 12 trials each for the 2-week, 4-week, 6-week, 12-week, and no-delay 
trials.  The number of trials were equal for both mood conditions.  Trials within blocks were 
presented in a randomized order.  Between-trial fixations points were on screen for between 1.5 
and 11.5 seconds.  Intervals between trials for fMRI participants were longer on average (4.5 
seconds) to accommodate the staggering of samples by the scanner needed to correctly account 
for the time course of the hemodynamic response.  The average interval between trials for the 
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behavioral-only participants was 1.75 seconds.  The total time for the second block of trials was 
approximately 4 minutes for the behavioral participants and 8 minutes for fMRI participants.  
The early choice for each trial was “today” and the delayed choice was 2 weeks, 4weeks, 6 
weeks or 12 weeks from today.   
Measure of Mood.  Before the first mood induction, between all blocks, and following 
the last delay discounting task, participants completed a brief subjective mood rating question set 
to establish current mood and evaluate the effectiveness of the mood induction.  Mood will be 
measured at six points throughout the study: 1. pre-negative induction, 2. post-negative 
induction, 3. post-negative induction delay discounting, 4. pre-neutral induction, 5. post-neutral 
induction, 6. post-neutral induction delay discounting.  This 6-item measure included questions 
for 6 emotional states: happy, calm, sad, bored, depressed, and anxious.  Moods of “anxious” and 
“calm” were added to the 4 mood induction protocol questions found in Robinson et al.  (2012).  
Anxiety was added because of its relation to negative urgency.  Calm was added to include a 
measure of positive-valence, low arousal mood.  Because of the constraints of responding in the 
scanner, the visual analog scale recommended in the Robinson protocol was adapted to work 
with a 4-key response pad.  Responses to the question, “How [mood] are you?” were “Not at 
all,” “Somewhat,” “A lot,” and “Very much.”  
Mood Induction Protocol 
The mood induction procedure in this study was similar to research from Berna et al.  
(2010), who used Velten-type (Velten, 1968) statements and mood-congruent music (Mayer et 
al., 1995; Wagner, Koschke, Leuf, Schlösser, & Bär, 2009).  This study’s protocol for mood 
induction for psychological research was also adapted from a published and validated protocol 
with special emphasis and guidance on neurophysiological research (Robinson et al., 2012).  The 
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delay discounting task was computerized version that has been established in previous Hoglund 
Brain Imaging Center (HBIC) fMRI studies.  Participants read a series of 58 Velten-type 
statements for 12 seconds each preceding a delay discounting task.  Each participant experienced 
one neutral mood induction followed by a block of delay discounting task and one negative 
mood induction block followed by a block of delay discounting task, with order of presentation 
balanced across participants.  Velten-type statements included “It often seems that no matter how 
hard I try, things still go wrong” for the negative mood condition and “The doorkeeper was 
dressed in red” for the neutral mood condition.  Mood-congruent lyricless music for each block 
was played during the induction to magnify the intensity of the emotion during the mood 
induction procedure.  Additionally, music from the immediately preceding mood induction block 
was played throughout the following delay discounting task to help maintain the induced mood.  
For the neutral mood induction The Planets, Op.  32: VII.  Neptune, the Mystic by Gustav Holst 
was played.  For the negative mood condition the piece Russia under the Mongolian Yoke in C 
Minor by Sergei Sergeyevich Prokofiev was played at half speed.  These pieces have been used 
previously in musical mood induction tasks to evoke the congruent mood in participants 
successfully (Berna et al., 2010; Robinson et al., 2012).  The length of effect for Velten-type 
mood induction tasks can be relatively short (several minutes) unless somehow maintained 
through the cognitive task as well (Clark, 1983; Guerrieri et al., 2007).  Additionally, music is 
recommended by Robinson et al.  (2012) as a way to maintain induced mood during follow-up 
cognitive tasks. 
Imaging Protocol 
FMRI scanning was performed at the University of Kansas HBIC, using a 3-Tesla 
Siemens Skyra Scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany).  Structural scanning included T1-
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weighted anatomical images will with 3D MPRAGE sequence (TR/TE= 23/2ms, flip angle =9°, 
FOV=256 mm, matrix=256x176, slice thickness=1 x 1 x 1.2 mm).  This scan is used for slice 
localization for the functional scans, Talairach transformation, and coregistration with fMRI 
data.  Gradient echo blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) scans are acquired in 35 contiguous 
oblique axial 3 mm slices at a 40º angle (TR= 2000 ms, TE= 25, flip angle = 90°, in-plane 
resolution=2.9mm).  Visual stimuli were back-projected to a screen from a shielded LCD 
projector.  To optimize signal in ventromedial prefrontal regions by minimizing susceptibility 
artifact, all participants were positioned in the scanner so that the angle of the AC-PC plane is 
between 17 and 22 in scanner coordinate space.  The angle was verified with a localization 
scan.  This careful positioning ensures that the 40 slice acquisition angle will be applied in the 
same way for all subjects.  These procedures were developed in collaboration with the HBIC MR 
physicist, Dr.  Phil Lee.   
Summary of Study Design 
The research project included a behavioral study and a neuroimaging study.  The 
experimental protocol for both studies was as similar as possible given constraints necessitated 
by using the fMRI equipment.  The primary differences in design between the two studies was 
the extra time required to complete the tasks in the scanner, different study location, additional 
instructions and preparation for fMRI participants, and overall longer study time for fMRI 
participants.  Participants performed a mood induction task of either neutral or negative mood 
followed by a delay discounting task.  Following an approximately 10 minute break to return to 
an emotional baseline, participants again completed a mood induction task followed immediately 
by a set of delay discounting choices.  Several brief “mood probes” were given between blocks 
of tasks to measure subjective mood changes in participants.  Presentation order of negative and 
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neutral mood conditions were counterbalanced among participants.  The time to complete the full 
protocol was approximately 50 minutes for behavioral participants and approximately 70-75 
minutes for fMRI participants.  Figure 1 illustrates the layout of the delay discounting and mood 
induction tasks.   
 
Figure 3  Behavioral and fMRI study design. 
 
 
Data Analysis and Interpretation 
Behavioral data were analyzed with IBM SPSS (version 22) and a p-value of <0.05 was 
used to indicate statistical significance unless otherwise specified.  The data were analyzed in the 
following steps: 1) Determine if groups by location were significantly different on demographic 
variables or mood induction effectiveness, 2) Determine if mood induction was successful for the 
mood states of interest (Sad, Depressed, Anxious), 3) Evaluate changes in impulsivity as 
measured by k as a function of changes in mood induction condition (Negative vs.  Neutral) 
(Aim 1 H1) and in terms of how k covaries with negative urgency (Aim 1 H2), 4) Examine 
functional differences in brain activation between mood conditions when choosing between 
immediate and delayed rewards (Aim 2 H1, H2), and Examine role of negative urgency when 
making immediate and delayed reward choices for negative and neutral mood conditions (Aim 3 
H1, H2).  Because participants completed all surveys during their time participating, the number 
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of missing values was very low (<.002%); since missing data represented an extremely small 
proportion of total responses and missing values did not appear to be systematically related, 
series mean replacement was used for these values in statistical calculations. 
Demographic Comparison 
Demographic information was analyzed using multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) to detect possible differences between fMRI and behavioral participants prior to 
analyzing combined group data.   
Differences between fMRI and behavioral groups on self-report measures, k-values, and mood 
ratings were analyzed using repeated measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA).  Self-report 
measures that were theoretically related to constructs being measured were evaluated using 
bivariate correlation to determine if between-group differences existed for location; scales 
evaluated included negative urgency, BIS-11 total score, CES-D total score, BAI-T total score, 
subscales from the Brief COPE measure, and subscales from the SPSRQ measure. 
Mood Comparison. To determine whether the mood induction resulted in reported 
change in mood by participants, the effectiveness of the mood induction (neutral vs. negative) 
was assessed using a repeated measures MANOVA including all 6 six emotions measured 
(Happy, Calm, Sad, Bored, Depressed, Anxious).  Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were used to 
adjust for non-sphericity of the data.   
Main effect for mood induction on Delay Discounting Rates (Aim 1, H1 and H2).  
Effects of mood induction on delay discounting rates (k) were analyzed using repeated measures 
ANCOVA.  For the predicted model, Negative Urgency was entered as a covariate for the model.  
Additionally, an exploratory, post hoc model using repeated measures ANCOVA with other 
personality scales as covariates was evaluated; covariates were determined by bivariate 
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correlation between collected k values at 3 time points and personality measures of impulsivity.  
All measures of impulsivity that were significantly (p < .05) correlated with a value of k at any 
time point were entered into the model as covariates. 
FMRI data analysis (Aims 2, H1 and H2; Aim 3, H1 and H2).  fMRI data were pre-
processed and analyzed using Analysis of Functional NeuroImages (AFNI; 
http://afni.nimh.nih.gov) software.  Pre-processing and statistical analyses were performed on 
each participant’s data in AFNI.  The fMRI images were realigned to the first slice collected in 
the first run to correct for motion.  The images were spatially smoothed with a 4 mm FWHM 
Gaussian blur.  Functional images were realigned to the anatomical images obtained within each 
session and normalized to Talairach and Tournoux’s (1988) stereotaxic atlas.  A region of 
interest (ROI) approach was used to address Aim 2. ROIs were defined based on coordinates 
from another delay discounting experiment by McClure et al. (2004).  Spherical ROI mask were 
created using a 3.5 mm radius for the DLPFC, lateral OFC, medial OFC, mPFC, PCC, VLPFC, 
and ventral striatum.  Locations of these ROIs are illustrated in Figure 4 and specific coordinates 
are shown in Table 1.  Mean percent signal change was extracted for each spherical ROI and 
included in the analysis described below. In addition, a whole-brain exploratory analysis was run 
to identify activations in regions outside of these spheres. To account for multiple comparisons, 
and cluster thresholding were used, (pvoxelwise < .01, pcorrected < .05, cluster size > 53 voxels).  
Cluster size will be determined based on Monte Carlo simulations implemented by AFNI’s 
3dClustSim program.  
To evaluate the effect of mood induction on decision-making (Aim 2), the negative affect 
condition was contrasted using a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the 
neutral affect condition and compared with participants’ immediate choices versus delayed 
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choices in a Mood × Decision-Making design.  To evaluate the relationship between negative 
urgency, mood induction, and decision-making (Aim 3), Mood × Decision-Making analyses 
were conducted using the same ROI masks and including negative urgency scores as a covariate 
with significant percent signal change in ROI-defined areas. 
 
Figure 4  Locations of 3.5 mm spherical ROIs. 
 
 
Table 1  A priori regions of interest for fMRI analyses 
 
Region x y z 
DLPFC 44 43 13 
Lateral OFC 24 48 -12 
Medial OFC -8 46 -6 
mPFC 0 43 9 
PCC -8 -26 31 
VLPFC 40 19 -8 
Ventral Striatum 6 8 -4 
Note. Coordinates are in Talairach space. 





The demographic breakdown of the sample were as follows.  All participants: American 
Indian or Alaskan native 1.5%, Asian or Pacific Islander 6.2%, Black 3.1%, White 86.2%, Other 
3.1%, not of Hispanic origin 89.2%, Hispanic origin 10.8%; behavioral participants: American 
Indian or Alaskan native 2.1%, Black 4.2%, White 89.6%, Other 4.2%, not of Hispanic origin 
85.4%, Hispanic origin 14.6%; fMRI participants: Asian or Pacific Islander 23.5%, White 
76.5%, not of Hispanic origin 100%.  All demographic data for behavioral and fMRI participants 
are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2  Participant Demographics 
 
 Sample distribution 
% (n): Behavioral 
Sample distribution 
% (n): fMRI 
Sample distribution 
% (n): Total 
Sex    
     Female 39.6 (19) (9) 43.1 (28) 
     Male 60.4 (29) (8) 56.9 (37) 
    
Race    
     American Indian 2.1 (1) 0.0 (0) 1.5 (1) 
     Asian or Pacific Islander 0.0 (0) 23.5 (4) 6.2 (4) 
     Black 4.2 (2) 0.0 (0) 3.1 (2) 
     White 89.6 (43) 76.5 (13) 86.2 (56) 
     Other 4.2 (2) 0.0 (0) 3.1 (2) 
    
Ethnicity    
     Not of Hispanic origin 85.4 (41) 100.0 (17) 89.2 (58) 
     Hispanic origin 14.6 (7) 0.0 (0) 10.8 (7) 
  
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) for age, gender, race, and ethnicity showed 
a no significant multivariate effect for behavioral and fMRI groups, Wilks’ λ = .864, F(5, 59) = 
1.856, p = .116, ηp2 = .136.  All participants (N = 66; 37 males) were aged between 18 to 31 
years (m = 19.74, SD = 2.56); behavioral participants (n = 48; 29 males) were aged between 18 
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to 31 years (m = 19.65, SD = 2.43); and fMRI participants (n = 18; 8 male) were aged between 
18 to 31 years (m = 20, SD = 3.96). One fMRI participant was excluded from analyses because 
of unusable fMRI data. 
Self-Report Variables 
MANOVA tests on the behavioral and fMRI groups on all scales of the BIS-11, UPPS+P, 
BIS/BAS, SPSRQ, Brief COPE, CES-D, and BAI-T were not significant for group differences, 
Wilks λ = .382, (F(33, 31) = 1.523, p = .121, ηp2 = .618).  Because the omnibus test was non-
significant, univariate results were not analyzed.  Descriptive statistics combined across 
experimental setting (fMRI and behavioral) are presented in Table 3.  Descriptive statistics for 
individual behavioral and fMRI groups are shown in Appendix A.   
  
Table 3  Combined Self-Report Impulsivity and Mood Measures 
 
Measure Name Mean SD Min Max Range 
BIS11 – Total 63.66 10.76 42 87 45 
     Attention 10.83 2.90 5 16 11 
     Cognitive Instability 6.61 1.69 3 11 8 
     Motor 15.11 2.91 11 24 13 
     Perseverance 6.68 1.62 4 11 7 
     Self-Control 12.63 3.67 6 22 16 
     Cognitive Complexity 11.80 2.83 6 17 11 
UPPS+P      
     Negative Urgency 27.58 5.24 15 41 26 
     Premeditation (lack of) 22.98 4.89 13 36 23 
     Perseverance (lack of) 20.03 4.57 10 32 22 
     Sensation Seeking 37.28 5.22 23 48 25 
     Positive Urgency 28.26 5.41 16 39 23 
SPSRQ      
     Sensitivity to Punishment 11.15 4.74 3 22 19 
     Sensitivity to Reinforcement 13.89 4.03 6 24 18 
BIS/BAS      
     BAS Drive 11.20 2.12 6 15 9 
     BAS Fun Seeking 12.57 2.02 7 16 9 
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Measure Name Mean SD Min Max Range 
     BAS Reward Responsiveness 17.77 1.74 13 20 7 
     BIS 22.96 3.36 16 29 13 
Brief COPE      
     Self-Distraction 5.71 1.56 2 8 6 
     Active Coping 6.03 1.22 4 8 4 
     Denial 2.77 0.95 2 5 3 
     Substance Use 3.32 1.73 2 8 6 
     Emotional Sup 5.32 1.76 2 8 6 
     Instrumental Sup 5.05 1.80 2 8 6 
     Behavioral Disengagement 3.18 1.30 2 8 6 
     Venting 4.28 1.32 2 8 6 
     Positive Reframing 5.86 1.55 2 8 6 
     Planning 6.12 1.42 2 8 6 
     Humor 5.43 1.86 2 8 6 
     Acceptance 6.45 1.15 3 8 5 
     Religion 3.82 1.87 2 8 6 
     Self-Blame 5.44 1.73 2 8 6 
CES-D – Total 12.37 7.83 2 31 29 




Between Group Differences. Because of the difference in study environment between 
fMRI and behavioral participants, a repeated measures MANOVA was conducted to determine if 
experimental setting was related to self-report mood scores obtained during mood induction.  
Omnibus test of mood ratings between fMRI and behavioral groups showed significant 
interaction effect between groups overall, Wilks λ = .747, F(6,58) = 3.266, p = .008, ηp2 = .253.  
Between-group univariate analyses (Bonferonni corrected α = .008) indicated that mood ratings 
differed significantly between location (fMRI versus behavioral) for Happy, F(1,63) = 15.304, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .195.  All other mood ratings were the same between locations.  Negatively 
valenced moods (Sad, Depressed, Anxious), of primary interest in this study, were not 
statistically different.  Initial Happy ratings appeared to be different, with fMRI participants 
reporting higher baseline Happy ratings.  The Happy rating pattern was similar for both mood 
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conditions at both locations, so both groups were analyzed together.  These results are 
summarized in Table 5. 
 
Table 4  Mean Mood Ratings 
 
Mood Pre-Neg Post-Neg Post-NegDD Pre-Neu Post-Neu Post-NeuDD 
Happy 2.88 (.76) 1.75 (.77) 2.08 (.89) 2.63 (.89) 2.35 (.89) 2.28 (.96) 
Calm 3.15 (.78) 2.71 (.93) 2.86 (.88) 3.11 (.89) 3.03 (.90) 2.82 (.92) 
Sad 1.23 (.52) 2.51 (1.03) 1.72 (.67) 1.35 (.57) 1.32 (.59) 1.37 (.65) 
Bored 2.45 (1.02) 2.65 (1.02) 2.97 (.95) 2.54 (1.08) 3.05 (1.05) 3 (1.03) 
Depressed 1.26 (.59) 2.17 (1.02) 1.48 (.69) 1.28 (.55) 1.28 (.55) 1.35 (.62) 
Anxious 1.77 (.86) 2.15 (1.03) 1.95 (.96) 1.97 (.94) 2.26 (.99) 2.32 (1.06) 
 
Table 5  Differences in Mood Ratings Based on Location (fMRI vs.  Behavioral groups) 
 
 Mood Condition df MS F Sig. ηp2 
Location Happy 1 5.874 15.304 <.001 0.195 
  Calm 1 0.001 0.002 0.969 0.000 
  Sad 1 0.129 0.583 0.448 0.009 
  Bored 1 3.027 5.162 0.027 0.076 
  Depressed 1 0.215 0.847 0.361 0.013 
  Anxious 1 0.252 0.490 0.486 0.008 
Error Happy 63 0.384 
   
  Calm 63 0.370 
   
  Sad 63 0.221 
   
  Bored 63 0.586 
   
  Depressed 63 0.254 
   
  Anxious 63 0.514 
   
Computed using Bonferonni corrected alpha = .008, Huynh Feldt corrected for non-sphericity. 
 
Mood Induction Effectiveness. To evaluate if subjective mood ratings changed as a 
function of mood induction, a repeated measures MANOVA was conducted for all mood ratings 
(Happy, Calm, Sad, Bored, Depressed, Anxious) across measurement points (1. pre-negative 
induction, 2. post-negative induction, 3. post-negative induction delay discounting, 4. pre-neutral 
induction, 5. post-neutral induction, 6. post-neutral induction delay discounting).  Omnibus test 
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results showed significant changes in mood ratings occurred throughout the duration of the 
experiment, Wilks λ = .160, F(30,35) = 6.129, p < .001, ηp2 = .840.  For within-subjects effects, 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity indicated assumptions of sphericity was violated for Happy, χ2(14) 
= 40.125, p < .001, ε = .862; Sad, χ2(14) = 77.164, p < .001, ε = .649; Bored, χ2(14) = 35.855, p = 
.001, ε = .895; Depressed, χ2(14) = 127.138, p < .001, ε = .634; and Anxious χ2(14) = 38.607, p < 
.001, ε = .867.  Because of nonsphericity, Huynh-Feldt correction was used for estimates of 
sphericity in the following analyses.  These results are summarized in Table 6.   
 










Happy .524 40.125 14 <.001 .862 
Calm .786 14.952 14   .382 .997 
Sad .289 77.164 14 <.001 .649 
Bored .561 35.855 14   .001 .895 
Depressed .129 127.138 14 <.001 .634 
Anxious .537 38.607 14 <.001 .867 
 
 
Table 7  Univariate tests for mood induction mood ratings 
 
 
Measure SS df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. ηp
2 
Time Happy 51.282 4.310 11.898 30.851 <.001 .325 
 
Calm 10.238 4.983 2.055 4.106 <.001 .060 
 
Sad 75.692 3.243 23.343 48.135 <.001 .429 
 
Bored 22.267 4.475 4.976 8.686 <.001 .119 
 
Depressed 40.331 3.171 12.720 30.188 <.001 .321 
 
Anxious 14.421 4.333 3.328 5.442 .004 .078 
Error Happy 106.385 275.843 .386 
   
 
Calm 159.595 318.885 .500 
   
 
Sad 100.641 207.526 .485 
   
 
Bored 164.067 286.404 .573 
   
 
Depressed 85.503 202.918 .421 
   
 
Anxious 169.579 277.311 .612 
   
Computed using alpha = .05 
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Within-group univariate analyses of variance (Bonferonni corrected α = .008) showed 
significant changes for all mood ratings during the experiment.  These findings are summarized 
in Table 7. To more clearly illustrate mood changes in relation to stages of the experiment, mean 
mood rating changes for Sad, Depressed, and Anxious mood ratings are shown in Figure 5, and  
Happy, Calm, and Bored are shown in Figure 6. Figures showing the magnitude and degree of 
change across all measurement points for all six measured moods is included in Appendix B.     
Pairwise comparisons for Sad mood ratings showed a significant increase (more sadness) 
following the negative mood induction procedure for the measurement immediately following 
negative mood induction, (MD = 1.227, SD = .134, p < .001) and for the subsequent negative 
mood condition delay discounting task (MD = .492, SD = .085, p < .001).  Sad mood ratings at 
baseline levels (i.e., immediately preceding neutral and negative mood induction) were not 
significantly different (MD = .123, SD = .071, p >.999).  For the neutral mood induction, Sad 
ratings were not significantly changed from baseline immediately following neutral mood 
induction (MD = -.031, SD = .073, p > .999) or neutral mood condition delayed discounting task 
(MD = .015, SD = .083, p > .999).   
Pairwise comparisons for Depressed mood ratings also showed a significant increase 
immediately following the negative mood induction procedure, (MD = .908, SD = .123, p < 
.001) but the effect was not significantly different following the negative mood condition delay 
discounting task (MD = .215, SD = .086, p = .227).  No other conditions were significantly 
different from each other, indicating that depressed mood ratings were only significantly 
elevated in the period following the negative mood induction.  The neutral mood condition did 
not appear to significantly affect Depressed mood scores. 
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Figure 6  Happy, Calm, and Bored Mood Ratings 
 
 
Pre Neg Post Neg Neg DD Pre Neu Post Neu Neu DD
Sad 1.23 2.51 1.72 1.35 1.32 1.37
Depressed 1.26 2.17 1.48 1.28 1.28 1.35








Pre Neg Post Neg Neg DD Pre Neu Post Neu Neu DD
Happy 2.88 1.75 2.08 2.63 2.35 2.28
Calm 3.15 2.71 2.86 3.11 3.03 2.82










Anxious mood ratings following negative mood induction were not significantly 
different, indicating that the negative mood induction did not influence anxiety levels.  The 
neutral mood induction also did not appear to significantly alter Anxious mood ratings from 
baseline. Complete pairwise comparison tables for all mood conditions are found in Appendix C. 
Delay Discounting and Mood Condition Comparison (Aim 1, H1 and H2) 
Predicted Model.  The a priori hypothesis for change in k values across mood conditions 
(initial, negative mood, neutral mood) with Negative Urgency as a covariate was evaluated by 
conducting a repeated measures ANCOVA.  Omnibus results showed no significant results for 
condition (i.e., baseline, post-mood induction, etc.), F(2, 62) = .788, p = .459, ηp2 = .025, or for 
condition by Negative Urgency, F(2, 63) = 1.026, p = .364, ηp2 = .032.  Analysis of between-
subjects and within-subjects showed no significant effects for condition or condition by Negative 
Urgency.   
Exploratory Model.  As a way to further understand the relationships between 
personality factors and possible effects that controlling for those factors would have on the 
ability to detect changes in k, a secondary model was evaluated from a data-driven approach.  
Covariates included in the repeated measures ANCOVA model for k values were determined by 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient to assess the relationship between k values and 
all scales of personality measures (UPPS+P, BIS11, BIS/BAS, SPSRQ, BAI-T, CES-D, Brief 
COPE).  Scales significantly correlated with k values in any condition were included as 
covariates.  Scales correlating with initial k values were Cognitive Complexity (r = .29, p = 
.021), Positive Urgency (r = .27, p = .029), Active Coping (r = -.27, p = .028), and Planning (r = 
-.37, p = .002).  Scales correlating with negative mood k values were Motor (r = .25, p = .048), 
Cognitive Complexity (r = .37, p = .003), BIS11 Total Score (r = .26, p = .040), Positive 
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Urgency (r = .32, p = .009), and Substance Use (r = .27, p = .031).  Scales correlating with 
neutral mood k values were Motor (r = .32, p = .009), Cognitive Complexity (r = .31, p = .013), 
and BIS11 Total Score (r = .28, p = .025).  Because Cognitive Complexity and Motor scales 
were subscales from the BIS11, they were not included as covariates because information from 
those scales was already accounted for in the BIS11 Total Score. 
A repeated measures MANCOVA was conducted for k values across conditions (initial, 
negative mood, neutral mood) with the following personality scales as covariates: Positive 
Urgency, BIS11 Total Score, Active Coping, Planning, and Substance Use.  Omnibus results 
showed a significant interaction effect for Planning by mood condition, F(2, 58) = 4.839, p = 
.011, ηp2 = .143.  Univariate within-subjects results show that the interaction effect for Planning 
by condition was significant, F(1.725, 101.770) = 3.842, p = .030, ηp2 = .061.  There was no 
significant multivariate effect for k-value changes by mood induction or other interaction effects.  
When including this particular set of covariates, the effect of the Planning variable has a 
significant effect where participants scoring higher on the planning scale appeared to have lower 
delay discounting rates when subjected to mood induction (i.e., appear to be less reactive to the 
negative mood condition). 
FMRI Results 
Effect of Mood Condition during Decision-making Task (Aim 2 H1, H2).  Contrasts 
for comparing negative mood and neutral mood conditions while engaged the delayed 
discounting task showed no significant activation differences for the spherical ROIs or the whole 
brain analysis.  Based on these results, we conclude that there was no significant main effect of 
mood induction on the cognitive processes used when selecting immediate rewards versus 
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delayed rewards either in terms of increased limbic activation (Aim 2 H1) or decreased 
activation in frontal areas related to cognitive control (Aim 2 H2).   
Negative Urgency, Mood Condition during Decision-making Task (Aim 3 H1, H2).  
Correlations between negative urgency and ROIs for areas of emotional activation (Aim 3 H1; 
medial OFC, mPFC, VLPFC, ventral striatum) and cognitive control (Aim 3 H2; DLPFC, lateral 
OFC, PCC) showed no significant relationship.  These findings suggest the neurological patterns 
of activation observed during delay discounting task and mood induction task were not related to 
participant’s self-reported levels of negative urgency. 
CES-D and BAI-T scores were evaluated because of their theoretical link to Negative 
Urgency and to more broadly explore the relation of long-term mood traits with mood state and 
decision making.  We conducted a similar analysis as with negative urgency, correlating the 
percent signal change of activation for predicted ROIs (medial OFC, mPFC, VLPFC, ventral 
striatum, DLPFC, lateral OFC, PCC).  Results were corrected for multiple comparisons using the 
False Discovery Rate (FDR) method as described in Benjamini and Hochberg (1995).  BAI-T 
scores were significantly correlated with activity in the right VLPFC, with greater activation 
observed during the negative mood induction condition for delayed and immediate decision-
making, r = .648, p = .005 (See Figure 7) .  Despite not seeing a relationship between BAI-T 
scores and k values behaviorally, this finding suggests that individuals with a higher trait-level 
anxiety are engaging this area differently from those with lower trait anxiety.  Despite 
participants not evidencing behavioral differences in their decision-making, the internal 
cognitive processes occurring while making delay discounting decisions do appear affected by 
negative mood state.  CES-D scores were not significantly correlated with activation following 
FDR corrections.  Full results of these correlations and corrected p-values are shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8  Self-Report Scale Correlations with fMRI ROIs, FDR Corrected 
 
Scale Region r p i q crit test 
Negative Urgency mPFC -.21 .417 1 0.05 .007 0 
 VS -.14 .583 2 0.05 .014 0 
 DLPFC -.14 .598 3 0.05 .021 0 
 vlPFC .14 .605 4 0.05 .029 0 
 LOFC .08 .763 5 0.05 .036 0 
 mOFC .06 .818 6 0.05 .043 0 
 PCC -.02 .943 7 0.05 .050 0 
        
BAI-T vlPFC .65* .005 1 0.05 .007 1 
 mPFC .40 .108 2 0.05 .014 0 
 mOFC .25 .343 3 0.05 .021 0 
 PCC .24 .362 4 0.05 .029 0 
 DLPFC .16 .551 5 0.05 .036 0 
 LOFC .05 .856 6 0.05 .043 0 
 VS .01 .964 7 0.05 .050 0 
        
CES-D DLPFC -.40 .111 1 0.05 .007 0 
 VS -.37 .149 2 0.05 .014 0 
 vlPFC .21 .428 3 0.05 .021 0 
 mPFC -.17 .512 4 0.05 .029 0 
 PCC .15 .574 5 0.05 .036 0 
 mOFC .09 .734 6 0.05 .043 0 
 LOFC -.03 .896 7 0.05 .050 0 
Note.  False discovery rate value *q = .05.  Individual critical values calculated for each correlation. 
 
Figure 7  Scatterplot of VLPFC % Signal Change and BAI-T Total Score. 
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The goal of the current study explored a specific sub-construct of impulsivity, negative 
urgency, to further increase the understanding of impulsivity’s increasingly integrated role in 
theories of personality and emotion regulation. The results demonstrated that successful mood 
induction occurred and, consequently, differences in behavioral impulsivity and neuronal 
activation patterns were observed in these conditions. However, the predicted role for Negative 
Urgency in these changes was not observed; instead, personality traits related to impulsivity had 
significant roles in the ways that discounting rates were changed behaviorally and the brain 
activation patterns indicating differential processing of the delay discounting task for those 
varying on different personality traits. 
Mood induction effectiveness 
The method used for negative mood induction was effective in influencing participants’ 
self-reported mood ratings for two of the three primary emotions of interest.  Immediately 
following the negative mood induction, participants rated their Sad and Depressed moods as 
greater than the baseline measurement.  Sad mood remained elevated above baseline upon 
completion of the delay discounting task.  The neutral task showed no significant changes in Sad 
or Depressed moods from baseline at any point in the task.  Unexpectedly, anxious mood was 
effectively unchanged following negative mood and neutral mood induction, remaining 
relatively elevated for the duration of the experiment.  The protocol from which the present study 
was adapted did not assess the “Anxious” mood state, and so no information about possible 
effects of this mood induction procedure on anxiety was available.   
 Overall, the mood ratings from participants indicate that the mood induction was 
successful for inducing negative mood for Sad and Depressed mood states.  The lack of 
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differentiation of Anxious mood between conditions presents some concern as the construct of 
Negative Urgency is conceptually closely related to that mood state in particular.  Happy, Calm, 
and Bored mood states appeared to be similar between conditions and did not represent major 
sources of variation for participants. 
Behavioral Impulsivity, Mood induction, and Delay Discounting (Aim 1) 
The behavioral impulsivity indexed by k values did not show any difference in the 
prediction that negative mood induction would alter discounting rates when including Negative 
Urgency as a covariate.   
BIS/BAS/FFFS model the delay discounting task may not have sufficiently created 
“punishment” that participants would be trying to avoid. This model posits that the effectiveness 
of the inhibition system depends on its efficiency regulating incoming emotional and cognitive 
information and that those with higher Negative Urgency would be particularly susceptible to 
that system being overwhelmed and delay discounting performance would decrease.  Delay 
discounting is by its nature a future-oriented, reward-focused mental process.  Though Negative 
Urgency has been shown to have a significant relationship with anxiety—an affective reaction to 
possible negative future consequences— thus a punishment-focused delay discounting task may 
have been more effective for showing differences with Negative Urgency.   
Lack of punishment in delay discounting paradigm may have insufficiently elicited 
negative affect in participants.  An extant study of performance by patients with obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD) on a Go/No-Go task found a significant increase in commission 
errors in conditions where direct punishment feedback was given (Morein-Zamir et al., 2013).  
The absence of overt punishing feedback in our delay discounting paradigm may have resulted in 
insufficient negative affect in participants with high Negative Urgency.  Another consideration is 
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that participants may have been able to make decisions in a more cognitive or logic-based 
manner rather than a more emotional manner because the rewards were hypothetical.  Though 
research has shown that hypothetical values result in similar patterns compared to real values 
(Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Madden et al., 2004), to our knowledge state-based mood changes 
have not been examined in terms of delay discounting.  Our model of impulsivity relies on the 
emotional component of decision-making to overwhelm the BIS, resulting in poor choices.  
Although the mood induction was effective in altering self-report mood, without actual monetary 
loss there may have been reduced need for mental resources being dedicated to emotional 
regulation. 
Additionally, while there is evidence for decreases in behavioral and cognitive 
performance as negative affect increases, examples include binge eating (Racine et al., 2013), 
aggression (Scott, DiLillo, Maldonado, & Watkins, 2015), self-report monetary discounting rates 
(Koff & Lucas, 2011), and memory encoding and recall (Potts, Camp, & Coyne, 1989), the 
degree of cognitive and emotional load may need to be sufficient to overload the BIS and this 
decrease in BIS performance may not be linear, requiring a threshold of cognitive load may be 
needed to overwhelm it.  A study evidencing this pattern was seen in Vytal, Cornwell, Arkin, and 
Grillon (2012), where the cognitive load of an n-back task was parametrically increased and 
performance was measured by an anxiety response; they observed significantly increased anxiety 
responses occurring after a threshold of cognitive load was surpassed, from “medium” cognitive 
demand to “high” cognitive demand.  A similar threshold of cognitive demand may be needed to 
result in the failure of the BIS.      
Finally, the construct of Negative Urgency may be more relevant to a slightly different 
aspect of delay discounting—delay maintenance (related to delay of gratification).  Delay 
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discounting is a highly cognitive task, involving weighing information, making idiopathic value 
judgments, and forecasting to the future (Bickel et al., 1999; Hirsh, Morisano, & Peterson, 2008).  
This decision-making task may be cognitively demanding by virtue of its complex, forward-
looking nature, but these choices may not tie directly to the subjective emotional experience an 
individual is feeling when making that decision.  Delay maintenance, conversely, requires 
individuals sustain a difficult choice over a period of time (Zayas, Mischel, & Pandey, 2014).  
The impulsive behaviors related to steeper delay discounting curves like gambling, alcohol use, 
and cigarette smoking are not necessarily perpetuated by a single choice about the future, but by 
continual choices supporting long-term goals (e.g., abstinence); when abstaining from these 
types of behaviors, an individual may revoke that choice at any time and choose the less optimal 
choice.  This process of sustained effort may be more taxing to the BIS and address more directly 
the question of whether increased mental demands (cognitive and emotional) may predict 
impulsive choices mediated by Negative Urgency.   
Exploratory Model.  Discounting rates were influenced by the interaction between mood 
condition and the Planning subscale from the Brief COPE, when controlling for several other 
personality factors as covariates (Positive Urgency, BIS11 Total Score, Motor, Cognitive 
Complexity, and Substance Use).  Specifically, negative mood induction increased discounting 
rates when accounting for participants’ action strategies for coping with future events.  Those 
with lower Planning scores showed higher k values (less impulsive) suggesting increased 
reactivity to the negative mood induction.  The neutral condition was statistically no different 
from participants’ baseline (pre-mood induction) k values.  It is important to note that this effect 
was significant only in the multivariate tests, meaning that a larger combination of personality 
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factors may need to be accounted for when considering the effect of Planning on delay 
discounting rates.   
Because the covariates for this model were determined post hoc, there is not a clear 
rationale for why controlling for these particular factors allowed for a change in k values to be 
detected.  Notably, the effect of controlling for the covariates was significant at the multivariate 
level, but none of the covariates were significant as univariate predictors.  This pattern suggests 
possible suppressor effects by the covariates, which may indicate that these factors are removing 
either a mediation or confounding effect between the mood condition and k values, similar to 
processes described by MacKinnon, Krull, and Lockwood (2000).  In this case, the covariates 
may be related to the variances of independent and dependent variables.  When including these 
factors in the model, we see an increase in the relationship between the conditions and k values, 
which is consistent with suppression. Future exploration of these variables would be needed to 
develop a theoretical framework to account for their relationship with delay discounting mood 
reactivity.  The questions that form the Planning scale (“I've been trying to come up with a 
strategy about what to do” and “I've been thinking hard about what steps to take”) suggest that a 
forward-looking focus on problem solving is a protective factor when coping with negative 
affect.  Future-oriented attention has been posited in other research as one theory for the 
mechanism underlying discounting rate differences in delay discounting (Radu, Yi, Bickel, 
Gross, & McClure, 2011). 
Despite finding no influence of negative urgency on delay discounting, impulsivity as 
measured by a delay discounting task is influenced by negative mood when accounting for other 
personality factors (i.e. planning).  While discounting rates have been shown to be stable over 
time intervals as long as 1 year (Kirby, 2009), situational factors, such as drug craving or 
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positive mood,  are also shown to affect discounting rates (Coffey et al., 2003; Hirsh et al., 2010; 
Koffarnus, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, & Bickel, 2013); the present results indicate that experimental 
manipulation of negative mood can also be an environmental factor that changes how individuals 
make discounting decisions.  Our hypothesized relationship between negative mood and negative 
urgency was not found, but there does appear to be a relationship between mood and discounting 
rates when accounting for personality. These findings support the general function of the 
predicted model regarding the change in impulsive behavior (i.e., discounting rates) when under 
emotional stress and as influenced by personality traits. Future studies examining mood and 
impulsive decision-making may also need to look into related personality factors, given the 
findings of the present study. 
Mood Induction and Brain Activation (Aim 2) 
The decision-making hypotheses that mood condition would have a significant main 
effect for decision-making and emotional regulation were not supported by the neuroimaging 
findings.  Based in these results, we conclude that the negative mood induction by itself did not 
result in a significant change in how participants engaged in their decision-making process, 
either in terms of increased emotionality or reduced frontal activation.  In terms of the predicted 
model, the neurological substrates of the BIS did not show systematic response to the presence of 
negative mood.  
Role of Urgency in Delay Discounting in fMRI (Aim 3) 
Negative Urgency. No relationship was found between Negative Urgency and mood 
induction in decision-making brain regions during delay discounting. This is consistent to what 
was found for the behavioral data (Aim 1). We believe that this lack of effect could be for similar 
reasons that behavioral k values were not related to negative urgency scores – that the task 
54 
 
presented may not have sufficiently elicited Negative Urgency. Because the construct of 
impulsivity is so diverse, differences in tasks may interact differently with different constructs, 
and, in this case, Negative Urgency may not have a strong relationship with delay discounting 
where the punishment aspect is more implied (e.g., that absence of reward) than direct (e.g., 
immediately losing money). 
Trait Anxiety.  The anxiety mood scale from the behavioral data showed that activation 
in the VLPFC was positively correlated with trait anxiety levels. In terms of the BIS/BAS 
Model, high trait anxiety is related to increased engagement of the BIS system, this increased 
engagement of the BIS system could lead to increased activation of the VLPFC in order to 
sustain non-impulsive decision-making when experiencing increased negative affect. VLPFC 
was shown in McClure et al. (2004) to have greater BOLD signal changes when participants 
were making relatively difficult decisions in a delay discounting task. Another study showed 
increased VLPFC activation for those with high motor impulsivity to maintain performance on a 
Go/No-go task (Goya-Maldonado et al., 2010). Other studies have found hypoactivation to be 
related to impulsive choices when the choices were difficult (de Ruiter et al., 2008; Hinvest et 
al., 2011). Unlike previous studies, we observed hyperactivation rather than hypoactivation of 
the right VLPFC. Since we did not see a behavioral change, we suggest that the right VLPFC 
hyperactivation solely reflects increased recruitment to maintain performance versus failure to 
recruit leading to impaired performance. We believe this increase in activation reflects additional 
cognitive demand required by those with high trait anxiety to make decisions in a way that is less 






Several caveats exist that limit the interpretation of these results.  Firstly, the population 
from which participants were selected represents a relatively small demographic slice of the 
overall population of adults in the United States.  The way in which delay discounting occurs 
may be sensitive to culture, socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, age, and other similar variables 
(Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999; Reimers, Maylor, Stewart, & Chater, 2009).  
Additionally, emotion regulation has been shown to change over the lifespan (Larcom & 
Isaacowitz, 2009), and so the rates at which this sample delay discounted and the ability to 
regulate emotion may not necessarily be the same for other groups. 
The inconsistent mood induction of anxiety presented another difficulty with ensuring 
that the BIS was sufficiently overwhelmed for those with his Negative Urgency. The 
implications are twofold.  First, the theorized relationship between negative mood and Negative 
Urgency is primarily thought to be mediated through anxiety.  While Sad and Depressed moods 
were substantially elevated by the negative mood induction, there was no significant effect on 
Anxious mood, meaning that reactivity to negative affect predicted by Negative Urgency would 
likely not exist at a detectable level if the primary negative mood state (anxiety) was not 
sufficiently elevated.  Second, since both negative and neutral mood inductions resulted in 
similar levels of Anxious mood, if an effect occurred it would be undetectable because there was 
no difference between conditions.  It is possible that participation in the experiment itself was 
anxiety provoking, increasing the baseline level of the anxiety for all participants.   During study 
debriefing, some participants stated that the neutral condition was confusing or frustrating 
because they could not easily identify what mood they were meant to be feeling.  The ambiguous 
nature of the task may have favored a slight bias toward Anxious mood from participants.  Both 
56 
 
the negative and neutral mood conditions could have maintained anxiety levels in participants 
that may have been present upon initial participation in the study.  In other words, instead of 
increasing anxiety, the mood induction may have prevented a natural decrease from baseline as 
participants became used to the study environment.  Any combination of the nonspecific 
environmental characteristics (e.g., meeting new people, engaging in novel tasks, etc.), 
unanticipated negative affect increase/maintenance following neutral mood induction, or 
ineffectiveness of the mood induction procedure for anxiety may have caused the pattern 
observed.   
Another limitation of this study is the experimental nature of mood induction tasks.  
Particularly, that mood induction in experimental settings seldom reflects the actual 
circumstances in which more typical negative mood states occur.  Negative mood states in actual 
life represent a complex interplay of countless variables (e.g., existing relationships with others, 
significant real-world consequences of choices) that are impossible to capture completely in an 
experimental design.  Additionally, there are ethical limitations to the degree that negative mood 
may be induced, which further limits the type of mood inductions used and the degree to which 
affect may be induced.  If the rate of delay discounting is commensurate with the intensity of 
negative affect, then the ability to detect that change is limited by the ability to elicit intense, 
lasting negative mood.   
Furthermore, in this study there we only had one behavioral measure of impulsivity used 
as the dependent measure (delay discounting).  A complex construct such as impulsivity may 
better be explored by multiple behavioral measures that would capture different facets of the 
construct.  Being able to measure decision-making using many tasks would be helpful to capture 
possible differences in how personality traits such as Negative Urgency and mood state might 
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interact with tasks requiring different cognitive and emotional demands, such as the Iowa 
Gambling Task or a Go/No-go task.  Additionally, the use of an fMRI design restricted the 
number of tasks that could be done because of how long participants could remain in the scanner 
for a single session.  Because the number of scans and times were limited, the number of tasks 
that could be adapted for fMRI and enacted in a short time was also limited.   
General Discussion 
Though we did not see the exact relationships between Negative Urgency, mood, and 
impulsivity as predicted, the results were nonetheless compelling and were consistent with the 
expected functions of the BIS/BAS/FFFS model and the role of negative affect influencing 
behavioral and neural differences. In particular, trait anxiety levels did predict differential 
cognitive process when making the delay discounting decisions, with high trait anxiety 
predicting greater VLPFC activation compared to low trait anxiety. Behaviorally, the results 
support the interaction between personality traits, state negative mood, and the mutability of 
discounting rates. 
One of the main features of impulsive behaviors is that they by definition serve an 
immediate need.  The ability to delay immediate reward in the service of long-term, more 
valuable reward is a powerful predictor of many health behaviors, including the development and 
maintenance of addictions.  A high ability to delay rewards is associated with being less likely to 
engage in risky behavior patterns, such as chronic smoking (Balevich, Wein, & Flory, 2013), 
substance abuse (Coffey et al., 2003; Perry & Carroll, 2008), and overeating (Guerrieri et al., 
2007).  Addictive behaviors follow a pattern of selecting an immediate reward, such as smoking 
a cigarette to reduce anxiety, while neglecting the reward of a more valued but less immediate 
goal, such as longer life or better health.  As addictive behaviors persist over time individuals’ 
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ability to delay rewards decreases, which perpetuates the selection of an immediate reward with 
long-term negative effects (Bickel et al., 2007).  This pattern results in a downward trajectory 
where individuals who may already demonstrate decreased ability to resist addictive behaviors 
are further impaired by the chronic behavior and therefore are even less equipped to cease the 
negative health behavior. 
The research from this study is intended to further the understanding of reward, 
impulsivity, and mood as they relate to decision-making.  We looked at Negative Urgency 
because of its relationship with negative mood states may be useful for understanding certain 
aspects of impulsive behaviors. For instance, the sensation-seeking type of impulsivity may 
explain propensity for engaging in cigarette smoking but not necessarily its maintenance 
(Balevich et al., 2013), whereas negative mood appears to be a factor in the maintenance process 
(Baker, Brandon, & Chassin, 2004; Covey, Glassman, & Stetner, 1998).  In this case the 
individual with higher sensation seeking might be receptive to a particular intervention prior to 
engaging in cigarette smoking, while the causes of impulsive behavior later in the addiction 
might be better targeted with emotion-based interventions. The results from the present 
experiment did not show a direct link with Negative Urgency and impulsive decisions made in a 
delay discounting task, either behaviorally or neurologically. However, recent research 
examining the role of Negative Urgency as a factor in cognitive control under negative mood 
induction (Gunn & Finn, 2015) supports the direction of the present study. The findings from the 
present study can be used to refine future hypotheses and to better understand the way in which 
this construct may be related to impulsivity and delayed gratification. On the other hand, the 
current study showed that there was a relationship between mood and decision-making, 
behaviorally as it related to other forms of impulsivity and coping measures, including planning 
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for the future, and neurologically in terms of trait anxiety levels correlating with increased 
activity in areas associated with cognitive control. Future studies will hopefully continue to 
illuminate the relationships between mood state, personality, and decision-making in ways that 
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APPENDIX A: Self-Report Scores for Behavioral and fMRI Participants 
Table 9  Behavioral Self-Report Impulsivity and Mood Measures 
 
Measure Name Mean SD Min Max Range 
BIS11 – Total 63.66 10.76 42 87 45 
     Attention 10.83 2.90 5 16 11 
     Cognitive Instability 6.61 1.69 3 11 8 
     Motor 15.11 2.91 11 24 13 
     Perseverance 6.68 1.62 4 11 7 
     Self-Control 12.63 3.67 6 22 16 
     Cognitive Complexity 11.80 2.83 6 17 11 
UPPS+P      
     Negative Urgency 27.58 5.24 15 41 26 
     Premeditation (lack of) 22.98 4.89 13 36 23 
     Perseverance (lack of) 20.03 4.57 10 32 22 
     Sensation Seeking 37.28 5.22 23 48 25 
     Positive Urgency 28.26 5.41 16 39 23 
SPSRQ      
     Sensitivity to Punishment 11.15 4.74 3 22 19 
     Sensitivity to Reinforcement 13.89 4.03 6 24 18 
BIS/BAS      
     BAS Drive 11.20 2.12 6 15 9 
     BAS Fun Seeking 12.57 2.02 7 16 9 
     BAS Reward Responsiveness 17.77 1.74 13 20 7 
     BIS 22.96 3.36 16 29 13 
Brief COPE      
     Self-Distraction 5.71 1.56 2 8 6 
     Active Coping 6.03 1.22 4 8 4 
     Denial 2.77 0.95 2 5 3 
     Substance Use 3.32 1.73 2 8 6 
     Emotional Sup 5.32 1.76 2 8 6 
     Instrumental Sup 5.05 1.80 2 8 6 
     Behavioral Disengagement 3.18 1.30 2 8 6 
     Venting 4.28 1.32 2 8 6 
     Positive Reframing 5.86 1.55 2 8 6 
     Planning 6.12 1.42 2 8 6 
     Humor 5.43 1.86 2 8 6 
     Acceptance 6.45 1.15 3 8 5 
     Religion 3.82 1.87 2 8 6 
     Self-Blame 5.44 1.73 2 8 6 
CES-D – Total 12.37 7.83 2 31 29 





Table 10  FMRI Self-Report Impulsivity and Mood Measures 
 
Measure Name Mean SD Min Max Range 
BIS11 – Total 63.66 10.76 42 87 45 
     Attention 10.83 2.90 5 16 11 
     Cognitive Instability 6.61 1.69 3 11 8 
     Motor 15.11 2.91 11 24 13 
     Perseverance 6.68 1.62 4 11 7 
     Self-Control 12.63 3.67 6 22 16 
     Cognitive Complexity 11.80 2.83 6 17 11 
UPPS+P      
     Negative Urgency 27.58 5.24 15 41 26 
     Premeditation (lack of) 22.98 4.89 13 36 23 
     Perseverance (lack of) 20.03 4.57 10 32 22 
     Sensation Seeking 37.28 5.22 23 48 25 
     Positive Urgency 28.26 5.41 16 39 23 
SPSRQ      
     Sensitivity to Punishment 11.15 4.74 3 22 19 
     Sensitivity to Reinforcement 13.89 4.03 6 24 18 
BIS/BAS      
     BAS Drive 11.20 2.12 6 15 9 
     BAS Fun Seeking 12.57 2.02 7 16 9 
     BAS Reward Responsiveness 17.77 1.74 13 20 7 
     BIS 22.96 3.36 16 29 13 
Brief COPE      
     Self-Distraction 5.71 1.56 2 8 6 
     Active Coping 6.03 1.22 4 8 4 
     Denial 2.77 0.95 2 5 3 
     Substance Use 3.32 1.73 2 8 6 
     Emotional Sup 5.32 1.76 2 8 6 
     Instrumental Sup 5.05 1.80 2 8 6 
     Behavioral Disengagement 3.18 1.30 2 8 6 
     Venting 4.28 1.32 2 8 6 
     Positive Reframing 5.86 1.55 2 8 6 
     Planning 6.12 1.42 2 8 6 
     Humor 5.43 1.86 2 8 6 
     Acceptance 6.45 1.15 3 8 5 
     Religion 3.82 1.87 2 8 6 
     Self-Blame 5.44 1.73 2 8 6 
CES-D – Total 12.37 7.83 2 31 29 
BAI-T – Total 10.42 8.07 0 32.38 32.38 
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APPENDIX B: Mood rating figures for negative and neutral mood inductions. 
Figure 9  Happy mood ratings for negative and neutral mood inductions 
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Figure 11  Sad mood ratings for negative and neutral mood inductions 
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Figure 12  Bored mood ratings for negative and neutral mood inductions  
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Figure 13  Depressed mood ratings for negative and neutral mood inductions 
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Figure 14  Anxious mood ratings for negative and neutral mood inductions 
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APPENDIX C: Pairwise comparisons for self-report mood ratings 
Table 11  Pairwise Comparisons for Happy Mood Rating 
 




1 2 1.12* .10 <.000 
 3 .80* .11 <.000 
 4 .25 .12 .775 
 5 .52* .09 <.000 
 6 .60* .11 <.000 
2 1 -1.12* .10 <.000 
 3 -.32* .08 .002 
 4 -.88* .11 <.000 
 5 -.60* .10 <.000 
 6 -.52* .12 <.000 
3 1 -.80* .11 <.000 
 2 .32* .08 .002 
 4 -.55* .11 <.000 
 5 -.28 .09 .068 
 6 -.20 .11 .954 
4 1 -.25 .12 .775 
 2 .88* .11 <.000 
 3 .55* .11 <.000 
 5 .28* .09 .038 
 6 .35* .09 .004 
5 1 -.52* .09 <.000 
 2 .60* .10 <.000 
 3 .28 .09 .068 
 4 -.28* .09 .038 
 6 .08 .07 1.000 
6 1 -.60* .11 <.000 
 2 .52* .12 <.000 
 3 .20 .11 .954 
 4 -.35* .09 .004 
 5 -.08 .07 1.000 
 
Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons. 
Mean differences based on estimated marginal means 





Table 12  Pairwise Comparisons for Calm Mood Rating 
 




1 2 .45* .12 .005 
 3 .29 .12 .231 
 4 .05 .13 1.000 
 5 .12 .13 1.000 
 6 .34 .13 .160 
2 1 -.45* .12 .005 
 3 -.15 .12 1.000 
 4 -.40* .12 .030 
 5 -.32 .13 .243 
 6 -.11 .14 1.000 
3 1 -.29 .12 .231 
 2 .15 .12 1.000 
 4 -.25 .13 .872 
 5 -.17 .11 1.000 
 6 .05 .13 1.000 
4 1 -.05 .13 1.000 
 2 .40* .12 .030 
 3 .25 .13 .872 
 5 .08 .11 1.000 
 6 .29 .13 .397 
5 1 -.12 .13 1.000 
 2 .32 .13 .243 
 3 .17 .11 1.000 
 4 -.08 .11 1.000 
 6 .22 .11 .775 
6 1 -.34 .13 .160 
 2 .11 .14 1.000 
 3 -.05 .13 1.000 
 4 -.29 .13 .397 
 5 -.22 .11 .775 
 
Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons. 
Mean differences based on estimated marginal means 






Table 13  Pairwise Comparisons for Sad Mood Rating 
 




1 2 -1.28* .14 <.000 
 3 -.49* .09 <.000 
 4 -.12 .07 1.000 
 5 -.09 .06 1.000 
 6 -.14 .07 .869 
2 1 1.28* .14 <.000 
 3 .79* .12 <.000 
 4 1.15* .12 <.000 
 5 1.19* .13 <.000 
 6 1.14* .14 <.000 
3 1 .49* .09 <.000 
 2 -.79* .12 <.000 
 4 .37* .08 .001 
 5 .40* .09 .001 
 6 .35 .09 .006 
4 1 .12 .07 1.000 
 2 -1.15* .12 <.000 
 3 -.37* .08 .001 
 5 .03 .07 1.000 
 6 -.02 .08 1.000 
5 1 .09 .06 1.000 
 2 -1.19* .13 <.000 
 3 -.40* .09 .001 
 4 -.03 .07 1.000 
 6 -.05 .07 1.000 
6 1 .14 .07 .869 
 2 -1.14* .14 <.000 
 3 -.35* .09 .006 
 4 .02 .08 1.000 
 5 .05 .07 1.000 
 
Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons. 
Mean differences based on estimated marginal means 






Table 14  Pairwise Comparisons for Bored Mood Rating 
 




1 2 -.20 .12 1.000 
 3 -.52* .10 <.000 
 4 -.09 .16 1.000 
 5 -.60* .14 .001 
 6 -.55* .14 .003 
2 1 .20 .12 1.000 
 3 -.32* .08 .003 
 4 .11 .14 1.000 
 5 -.40* .12 .026 
 6 -.35 .12 .067 
3 1 .52* .10 <.000 
 2 .32* .08 .003 
 4 .43* .13 .027 
 5 -.08 .12 1.000 
 6 -.03 .11 1.000 
4 1 .09 .16 1.000 
 2 -.11 .14 1.000 
 3 -.43* .13 .027 
 5 -.51* .12 .002 
 6 -.46* .14 .030 
5 1 .60* .14 .001 
 2 .40* .12 .026 
 3 .08 .12 1.000 
 4 .51* .12 .002 
 6 .05 .12 1.000 
6 1 .55* .14 .003 
 2 .35* .12 .067 
 3 .03* .11 1.000 
 4 .46 .14 .030 
 5 -.05 .12 1.000 
 
Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons. 
Mean differences based on estimated marginal means 






Table 15  Pairwise Comparisons for Depressed Mood Rating 
 




1 2 -.91* .12 <.000 
 3 -.22 .09 .217 
 4 -.02 .07 1.000 
 5 -.02 .07 1.000 
 6 -.09 .08 1.000 
2 1 .91* .12 <.000 
 3 .69* .11 <.000 
 4 .89* .12 <.000 
 5 .89* .12 <.000 
 6 .82* .12 <.000 
3 1 .22 .09 .217 
 2 -.69* .11 <.000 
 4 .20 .08 .153 
 5 .20 .07 .121 
 6 .12 .08 1.000 
4 1 .02 .07 1.000 
 2 -.89* .12 <.000 
 3 -.20 .08 .153 
 5 .00 .07 1.000 
 6 -.08 .08 1.000 
5 1 .02 .07 1.000 
 2 -.89* .12 <.000 
 3 -.20 .07 .121 
 4 .00 .07 1.000 
 6 -.08 .03 .376 
6 1 .09 .08 1.000 
 2 -.82* .12 <.000 
 3 -.12 .08 1.000 
 4 .08 .08 1.000 
 5 .08 .03 .376 
 
Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons. 
Mean differences based on estimated marginal means 



















Table 16  Pairwise Comparisons for Anxious Mood Rating 
 




1 2 -.38 .14 .117 
 3 -.18 .11 1.000 
 4 -.20 .11 .973 
 5 -.49* .11 .001 
 6 -.55* .13 .001 
2 1 .38 .14 .117 
 3 .20 .13 1.000 
 4 .18 .16 1.000 
 5 -.11 .15 1.000 
 6 -.17 .16 1.000 
3 1 .18 .11 1.000 
 2 -.20 .13 1.000 
 4 -.02 .12 1.000 
 5 -.31 .12 .183 
 6 -.37* .12 .046 
4 1 .20 .11 .973 
 2 -.18 .16 1.000 
 3 .02 .12 1.000 
 5 -.29 .12 .328 
 6 -.35 .14 .181 
5 1 .49* .11 .001 
 2 .11 .15 1.000 
 3 .31 .12 .183 
 4 .29 .12 .328 
 6 -.06 .09 1.000 
6 1 .55* .13 .001 
 2 .17 .16 1.000 
 3 .37* .12 .046 
 4 .35 .14 .181 
 5 .06 .09 1.000 
 
Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons. 
Mean differences based on estimated marginal means 
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APPENDIX E: FMRI participant travel instructions 
Provided below are maps and directions to Hoglund Brain Imaging Center (HBIC) at the KU Med Center campus.  Please 
read carefully as the location can be difficult to find.  Parking for participants is free and available in the spaces directly 
in front of the HBIC entrance.  Please follow the directions for HBIC at the end of this document specifically as many GPS 
and mapping software will guide you to the main hospital entrance but not HBIC. 
This study will involve time being scanned in an fMRI machine.  This is not recommended for those with metallic medical 
implants or claustrophobia.  You have been prescreened via SONA for most of these conditions, but if you have any 
concerns or questions about this process, or need more specific directions to the HBIC, please contact Ty Owens (###-
###-####).  If for any reason you are unable to make this appointment, please let us know ahead of time so we can make 
the appropriate changes to our schedule.  Thank you for your participation in this study. 
Directions to the University of Kansas Medical Center 
 
The University of Kansas Medical Center is centrally located on the major interstate highway system.  The medical center 
campus is a mile south of I-35 and 7th St. Trafficway South, at 39th Avenue and Rainbow Boulevard (3901 Rainbow 
Boulevard) in Kansas City, Kansas.  The main entrance of the hospital is located on Cambridge Street. 
From the North (Kansas City International Airport) 
I-29 South to I-35 South 
Exit 7th St.  Trafficway South, 7th St. becomes Rainbow Blvd. 
Continue south on Rainbow Blvd. to 39th St. 
Turn left at 39th St. and go to Cambridge St. 
Turn right at Cambridge St. 
From the West 
I-70 East to 7th St. Trafficway South 
Exit 7th St. Trafficway South 
7th St. becomes Rainbow Blvd. 
Continue south on Rainbow Blvd. to 39th St. 
Turn left at 39th St. and go to Cambridge St. 
Turn right at Cambridge St. 
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From the East 
I-70 West to downtown Kansas City, MO 
Merge onto I-35 South and go to 7th St. Trafficway 
Exit 7th St. Trafficway South 
7th St. becomes Rainbow Blvd. 
Continue south on Rainbow Blvd. to 39th St. 
Turn left at 39th St. and go to Cambridge St. 
Turn right at Cambridge St. 
 
From the South 
Via I-35; travel North on I-35 to Rainbow Blvd. exit 
head south on Rainbow to 39th St. 
Turn left at 39th St. and go to Cambridge St. 
Turn right at Cambridge St. or 
 
Exit I-435 at State Line Road 
head north on State Line Road to 39th Street 
Turn left at 39th St. and go to Cambridge St. 
Turn right at Cambridge St. 
Hoglund Brain Imaging Center Building (North campus) 
Directions:From I-70 or I-35, exit on US 169 south toward Seventh Street Trafficway/Rainbow Boulevard. 
Proceed south on US 169/Seventh Street Trafficway/Rainbow Boulevard. 
Turn left (east) on 39th Street and take the next left (north).  HBIC is the second building on the right. 
 
